## File #:

62-HQ-116395

# Serial Scope:

1166-1176, 1176x, 1176x1-1179, 1181, 1184-1186, 15+ NR 1188-1191x1

J. A. Mintz 2 - Mr(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy

December 10, 1975

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar 1 - Mr. J. P. Thomas

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to the November 26, 1975, request of the SSC for information, in summary form, relating to instances in which information obtained by the FBI was used effectively to prevent violence.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is a memorandum in response to that request. A copy of the memorandum is furnished for your records.

It is noted that the aforementioned request was received by the FBI on December 9, 1975. In view of the indicated urgency of the request, the enclosed memorandum, based on readily available summaries of information believed responsive and/or pertinent, has been prepared. It has not been possible within the limited time available to locate and examine documents underlying the events described. is not, therefore, known whether or not such underlying documents could be produced without jeopardizing current operations or informants and sources of continuing value. However, should the SSC request access to documents underlying any of the items included in the memorandum, efforts will be initiated to locate them and to determine the extent to and form in which SSC access to them may be granted.

1/ENGINETE REC-50 02 -///5 SEE NOTE PAGE 2 Dep. AD Adm. \_ Enclosures (2) Asst. Dir.: 62-116395 1 - The Deputy Attorney General Michael E. Shaheen, Jr. Attention: Ident. Special Counsel for JPT: 1hb lhb Intelligence Coordination Plen. & Evel. AGEO INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

GPO: 1975 O - 569-920

Assoc. Dir.

Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_

Admin. .

Comp. Syst. \_

Inspection

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The Attorney General

## NOTE:

Response is based on memorandum Cassidy to Wannall, dated 10/17/75, captioned "FBI Domestic Security Investigations," prepared by AFV:vb, which contained a review of pertinent material as located in INTD inspection reports from 1970 to 1975.

Mr. J. A. Mintz (1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis) 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall 1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar 1 - Mr. J. P. Thomas

62-116395

and is not for dissemi-official proceedings by to unauthorized person-

your request a is limited to o be disclosed to FBI.

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December 10, 1975

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

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A Los Angeles racial informant in December, 1969, furnished valuable information which was instrumental in second or with the confrontation between the Los Angeles Police Department and the Black Panther Party (BPP).

A Detroit racial informant advised that the National Dep. AD Adm. Committee to Combat Fascism headquarters in Detroit, a BPP Asst. Din: ) operation, had become a veritable fortress. The stockpiling Admin. V of weapons in that office included an arsenal of over 46

Comp. Syst. Weapons and 4,000 rounds of ammunition, along with four sticks Files & Com. of dynamite. Gen. Inv. \_\_

Inspection ORIGINAL AND ONE TO ATTORNEY GENERAL

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MUSEE NOTE PAGE 6

62-116395-119

NW 55101 DocId:32989554 Page 4 RE: U. S. SEHATE SELECT COUNTIES TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH PESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Miami ghetto racial informants were responsible for the identification of the principal suspects in four fire bombings, and this information enabled local police to make the arrest of the suspects and charge them with first-degree arson.

A Cleveland racial informant obtained advance information concerning planned racial violence. This was furnished to the police department which took appropriate preventive action.

In May, 1969, New Orleans and Jackson informants were instrumental in neutralizing high order explosives which were in 5 possession of the Klan. This action has probably saved lives since the Klan group involved has terrorized Ecgroes in the past.

A Detroit racial informant furnished advance information regarding planned ambush of Detroit police officers which enabled the Detroit Police Department to take necessary action to prevent injury or death to the officers and resulted in the arrest of eight persons and the seizure of a cache of weapons. The informant also furnished information resulting in the location and confiscation by Bureau Agents of approximately 50 sticks of dynamic available to BPP and likely resulted in saving of lives and preventing possible property damage.

A Chicago racial informant furnished information which identified an individual who is a member of the BPP as the person who raped and shot a housewife and then pistol whipped her husband in Chicago on December 25, 1970. The same Chicago informant furnished information which resulted in the identification of an individual who was responsible for the nurder of a police officer in Carbondale, Illinois.

A Springfield ghetto informant furnished information concerning an individual who was attempting to sell explosives. 

§ This information enabled local authorities to apprehend the individual and confiscate 100 pounds of explosives.

In informant of the <u>Richmond Office</u> reported a conspiracy by leaders of the <u>Washington</u>, D. C., Chapter of the <u>BPP</u> and leaders of the <u>Richmond Information Center (RIC)</u>, an affiliate of the <u>BPP</u>, to steal and transport weapons from <u>Richmond</u>, Virginia, to <u>Washington</u>, D. C.

RE: U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

As a result of this information developed and other investigation, two of the BPP leaders in Washington and three RIC leaders in Richmond, Virginia, were subsequently indicted by a Federal Grand Jury. Subsequent trial resulted in the conviction of the two Washington, D. C., leaders and two of the RIC leaders.

Detroit extremist informants advised that a BPP member was involved in a holdup killing in Detroit. He also advised that this individual was carrying the same pistol used in the killing, which enabled the Detroit police to arrest the BPP member, recover the pistol, and determine that this weapon was used in the killing referred to above.

A <u>Detroit</u> informant provided information which saved two lives. This informant, who was a member of the BPP, was instrumental in saving the lives of two BPP members who were being disciplined by the BPP. His information, when furnished to local police, was responsible for the arrest of seven BPP members, who were charged with kidnapping and assault to do bodily harm less than murder.

A Memphis informant furnished information which prevented a shoot-out between members of the BPP chapter and the Memphis | Police Department.

In July, 1971, a then recently developed member informant of the black extremist "Afro Set," headquartered in Cleveland, Ohio, furnished us extensive information concerning criminal activities by this group, including information related to several murders of whites which occurred in 1970. We furnished this information to local authorities in Cleveland. Working in conjunction with our Cleveland Office, the Cleveland Police Department instituted an intensive investigation and in October, 1971, a local grand jury returned secret indictments against six members of "Afro Set," including its leader, Harellel B. Jones. In March, 1972, Jones received a life sentence following a trial in which our informant was a key witness. Two other "Afro Set" functionaries who had been involved in this murder plot pleaded guilty and received life sentences.

RE: U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

The Secret Army Organization (SAO) is an anticommunist, ultraconservative, paramilitary organization founded in October, 1971, in San Diego, California, by former members and purporters of the Minutemen organization. Its purpose is to conduct urban guerrilla-type warfare against "left-wing" groups and suspected "enemies of the United States."

As a result of information furnished by a long-time FBI extremist informant, local authorities arrested eight members of the SAO on charges ranging from attempted murder to the possession and storage of illegal quantities of gunpowder. N Search varrants executed in connection with these arrests led to the recovery of a large cache of explosives, rifles, handguns, a flame thrower, thousands of rounds of military ammunition and a large quantity of extremist literature.

A Minneapolis informant obtained information on a proposed assassination of a narcotics agent. This information was given to Federal Bureau of Marcotics and the individuals involved in the plot were arrested.

A Detroit extremist informant furnished advance information regarding a plot of the Cleaver Faction of the BPP and a member of the White Panther Party (WPP) to hijach an airplane and hold passengers as hostages for the purpose of obtaining release of two jailed BPP leaders. This information resulted in the arrest of the WPP member, who attempted to hijach the plane, and the arrest of others on a conspiracy charge.

A Jackson informant furnished information indicating that Byron De La Deckwith, a noted Klansman from Mississippi, planned to blow up the home of the head of the Antidefamation League in New Orleans. Information from this informant enabled New Orleans police to arrest Beckwith in possession of a substantial dynamite bomb capable of destroying not only the home of the intended victim but those of surrounding neighbors.

A <u>Petroit</u> informant furnished information concerning a possible plan to kill police officers at the funeral of an 14 individual killed by police. As a result of information from

RE: U.S. SENATE SELECT CONTETEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLECTUCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

our informant, the Datroit police removed all uniformed officers from the scene of the funeral, thus avoiding a potentially dangerous situation.

In 1973, seven members of the orthodox Manafi
Muslim sect in Washington, D. C., were brutally murdered.
Entremist informants of the Philadelphia Division contributed
materially to the identification of the murderers, which
resulted in the conviction of six Mation of Islam (NOI)
members from Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, in late 1974 and
early 1975. Whese individuals received consecutive life terms
totalling a minimum of 140 years in prison.

In June, 1974, it was determined that a white hate activist, Frank Drager, planned to bomb two blocks of an unidentified city on July 4, 1974. Drager, it later developed, was in possession of diagraps of the sewer and unter systems of Washington, D. C., and planned to bomb the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Building. After intensive investigation, unlawful flight process was obtained for Drager, who was vanted on local check charges. We was arrested with a number of associates in New Jersey in late June, 1974. These individuals were in possession of numerous veryons and chemical components. Drager was incarcerated on local charges. This investigation was instrumental in the prevention of a bombing and may have saved numerous lives.

On August 7, 1974, a dynamite bomb was discovered in the United Nations Building in New York City. Investigation identified Michael Balsey Brown, an affiliate of the white hate National Socialist White People's Party (MSEMP) and Identity of Group (IG), as the attempted bomber. Brown was convicted on December 3, 1974 on Federal charges, including the Interstate Transportation of Emplosives. The extremist matter investigation of Brown directly contributed to the successful conclusion of this case.

RE: U.S. SENATE SELECT CO'TMITTLE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

A Detroit, Michigan, informant furnished information regarding plans being made by the Black Panther Party (EPP) to arrange a jailbreak of individuals incarcerated in the Westchester County, New York, jail on bank robbery charges.

>2 Data was furnished local authorities including prison officials and necessary security steps were instituted to thwart this attempted jailbreak.

One of our extremist informants in the New Mayon,
Connecticut, area furnished information regarding the identity
of individuals involved in 15 arsons, including one which resulted
in a fatality. The informant also furnished advance information
regarding a proposed arson of a dwelling occupied by 18 persons,
13 of whom were children. This information was immediately
furnished to local authorities and undoubtedly was instrumental
in saving a number of lives.

During the latter part of 1974, a source determined that an individual was endeavoring to bomb a store in Portland, Oregon. This information was furnished to local police authorities, who were able to arrest the subject without compromising the source. When arrested, subject was armed and in possession of a four-stick dynamite bomb. The subject was subsequently convicted and sentenced to fifteen years in prison.

1 - The Attorney General

#### NOTE:

Material herein is based on memorandum Cassidy to Wannall, dated 10/17/75, captioned "FBI Domestic Security Investigations," prepared by AFW:vb, which contained a review of pertinent material as located in INTD inspection reports from 1970 to 1975.

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WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535
Liddressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
Used to prevent violence.  Report dated 12/10/75  Report dated 12/10/75  Report dated 12/10/75  Report dated 12/10/75  Info obtained
Originating Office: FBI
Delivered by: (10 ) (31 Date: 12/16/79
Received by: Atan K. Wellow
Title: receptionist
Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE U 21 000 BYS P & Pun / M



SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

Intelligence Community Staff FROM: ATTN: Central Index FBI SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees 1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term. If a document was made available 2. DATE PROVIDED for review but not transmitted, so note.) 12/10/75 DOCUMENT BRIEFING INTERVIEW TESTIMONY OTHER 3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate) SSC X 4. IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject) Memorandum 5. IN RESPONSE TO (list date and item number if in response to formal request, other-6. CLASSIFICATION OF wise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.) INFORMATION (enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword) SSC letter 11/26/75 U KEY WORDS (enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis) Information handling 8. SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this item) Specific instances cited regarding information obtained by the FBI and used effectively to prevent violence. 62-116395 FMK: fmk (4) ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75 ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS JUNGLASSIFIED AM JUNG

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

TREAT AS YELLOW

3791 (6-75)

#### INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY — enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

Dep.-A.D.-Adm ... Dep.-A.D.-Inv.\_\_\_ Interspec, Inc. Asst. Dir.: Admio SUITE 310 Come Sys Ext. . "f 1120 CONNECTICUT AVENUE Film & Com. God Inv. \_ WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036 Iden .. 202-347-1958 Intell .... Laboratory . Plan & Evel. ... Spec. Inv. PRESIDENT Training .... Legal Coun ..... Telephone Ria. \_\_ Director Sec'y December 10, 1975 Honorable Nicholas P. Callahan Associate Director Federal Bureau of Investigation Washington, D. C. 20535 Dear Nick: Attached is a copy of a letter I wrote to Senator Church yesterday. it does more good than harm. 5 JAN C 1973 Best wishes., REC- 104 -ENGLOSURE MACTOSTES 170 1351 10 1976 3 DEC 37 1075 ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED Pers. Rec. E. Nit 8 4 MAR 1 1 1976 いトンス コリーリ

NW 55161 DocId:32989554—Page 1

Robert L. Shortley 310 North Pitt Street Alexandria, Virginia 22314

December 9, 1975

Senator Frank Church United States Senate Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Church:

Taking the liberty of presuming on our short past acquaintance, I am writing you to express my deep concern over the tragic adverse criticism being levelled at the FBI in the news media as a result of current congressional inquiries into United States intelligence operations.

As you well know, ninety per cent (90%) of the work of the Bureau is concentrated on the investigation of violations of U. S. criminal statutes over which the FBI has primary investigative jurisdiction. Your committee and the other committees of the Congress now looking into the activities of the Bureau are therefore examining and criticizing the work which constitutes a very small percentage of their overall responsibility. Not to stress the long and successful history of the Bureau along with the few mistakes (the Congress itself has had its share) they have made over the years is, I think, unfair and not in the national interest. Just one example of the effect these stories are having occured Sunday, November 30th, when the Washington Post carried a letter to the Editor entitled "The FBI Discredited". That letter followed testimony before Congressional committees relative to the FBI, much of which was unfair and misleading. The letter itself, I'm sure you will agree, contained not one fact but was filled with personal vituperations against the FBI and its officials.

Secondly, you know and I know, as a former congressional investigator, that each and every witness is interviewed by committee staff members long before he formally appears before the committee. For the life of me I cannot understand why a reputable and responsible congressional committee would allow testimony to be put on the record when it had already been denied by officials of the FBI and was, in fact, untrue. I refer, for example, to statements made by Mr. Rowe last week.

This Nation is in grave danger of having its greatest law enforcement agency (FBI) unnecessarily destroyed based on,

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE II IN COOL BYSPA PUM INF TIMOR-16 W 55101 DocId:32989554 Page 14

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Senator Frank Church December 9, 1975 Page 2

at least partially, untrue and/or unsubstantiated statements of witnesses.

I urge you, Senator, to be fair and judicious. To my mind the current rash of congressional hearings have not been that.

Proper and effective law enforcement cannot be realized without the full voluntary cooperation of the citizens of this country. Congressional hearings and the news media are distroying that bond sometimes for nothing more than political ambition, financial reward or basic dislike of law enforcement agencies themselves.

I am taking the liberty of forwarding a copy of this letter to Senator Tower, my two Senators and my Congressman.

Respectfully yours,

Robert L. Shortley

DEC:10 1975

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Mr. Michael J. Shaheen, Jr. Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice 9
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. Shaheen:

This is in reference to your communication with enclosure addressed to me on November 14, 1975, and entitled "Request from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence." Pursuant to the request contained therein, I have had responses prepared to the enumerated questions posed by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, copies of which are attached hereto in duplicate.

The material incorporated in the referenced responses was extracted from the official Service records relating to Thomas and Hana Riha, which were procured from the field and will be temporarily housed at Service headquarters during the pendency of this matter before the Committee. The Central indices of this Service contain no record relating to Gloria (Galya) Ann Tannenbaum, nee Forest.

It is hoped that the foregoing is responsive to your request and of assistance to the Committee. In the event I can be of further assistance to you in this or any other matter, please consider me at your disposal. Since the responses set forth in the attachment contain reference to matters involving the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the CIA, the Directors thereof are being provided with copies of this communication and attachments by endorsement.

REC-25

Sincerely, 62-/16395-11C

L. F. Chapman, Jr. Commissioner

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Enclosures

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
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Please find attached hereto copies of the communication and enclosure under acknowledgement together with a copy of the attachment to the instant response, since the latter contains references relating to operational considerations relating to this case, which were interchanged by Denver offices of this Service and the Bureau.

cc: Director, Central Intelligence Agency Washington, D. C. 20505

Please find attached hereto copies of the communication and enclosures under acknowledgement together with a copy of the attachment to the instant response, since the latter contains references relating to operational considerations relating to this case, which were interchanged between this Service and your agency.

cc: Director, Intelligence

With copies of communication and enclosures under acknowledgement pursuant to your request.

ENF: JPC: dlw

ENCFORNEE

62-116375 - 1191

HAMRIAN .... HOWARD II. BAKER, JR., TENN. BARRY COLDWALLR, ARIZ. CHARLES MG C. MATHIAS, JR., MD. RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIFF COUNSEL IMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

## United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, SITH CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510


August 22, 1975


Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq. Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination Office of the Deputy Attorney General U. S. Department of Justice Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mike:

On May 14, 1975, the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities requested all memoranda and other materials related to the 1969 disappearance of Associate Professor Thomas Riha, University of Colorado, insofar as such memoranda and materials related to: (a) efforts of the FBI to ascertain the identity of confidential sources of the Central Intelligence Agency; and (b) inspections and administrative inquiries related to the disclosure of information to Dr. Joseph R. Smiley, then President of the University of Colorado. The Select Committee also requested all memoranda and other material related to actions by the Director or any other official of the FBI severing liaison or terminating contact between personnel of the FBI and personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency. June 13, 1975, the Select Committee received a very adequate response to the Committee's May 14 request!

The Select Committee would, however, like to request one further item in relation to the Riha case. Specifically, the Select Committee would the disappearance of Associate all information relating to the disappearance of Associate UNFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS





Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq. Page Two

August 22, 1975

Professor Riha, any and all background material the Bureau may have on his disappearance, and any subsequent information the Bureau has developed on his current whereabouts.

. Sincerely,

John T. Elliff

Director

Domestic Intelligence Task Force

### Response to May 14, Request

Appendix C

Section I: Huston Plan and Related Developments

Item 7a.

- 7. All memoranda and other materials relating to the 1969, disappearance of Associate Professor Thomas Tiha, University of Colorado, insofar as such memoranda and materials relate to:
  - a. Efforts of the FBI to ascertain the identity
     of confidential sources of the Central Intelligence Agency; and

#### QUESTIONS AND REGEONSES RE: THOMAS RIHA

- Q. Was Mrs. Gloria (Galya) Tannenbaum of Denver and Goulder, Colorado, ever employed directly or indirectly by the INS? When? In what capacity?
  - A. A thorough search of all retrievable personnel records for the U. S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) disclosed no record of a Mrs. Gloria (Calya) Tannenbaum nee Forest, having ever been employed directly or indirectly by this Service in any capacity.
- 2. Q. Was Mrs. Tannenbaum ever hired by INS in connection with the visa status of Riba's wife, Mrs. Hana Riba, formerly Hana Hrushkova or Hrushkovnova?
  - A. Mrs. Tannenbaum was never hired by INS in connection with the visa status of Riha's wife, Mrs. Hana Riha nee Hrushkova.
- 3. Q. What inquiry was made by John L. Todd, INS District Director in Denver, after he received a call early on the morning of March 9, 1969, involving a disturbance at the Thomas Riha home in Equider, Colorado? The disturbance involved Riha, lies. Tanzenbaum and Mrs. Hana Riha and ether placed in Mrs. Riha's bedroom, apparently to overcome her.
  - A. A thorough review of official Service files C-7 105 013 (Thomas Riha) and A14 627 222 (Mana Riha) contains no written material indicating that then District Director John L. Todd (now retired) had received a call early on the morning of March 9, 1969, relating to a disturbance occurring at the home of Thomas Riha, involving Mrs. Tannenbaum, Mrs. Mana Riha and her husband Thomas. This does not necessarily mean that he did not receive such a call but merely that he made no written record of same, if in fact he received such a call.

Irrespective of such a call, the immigration status of Mrs. Hana Riha was already a matter of Service inquiry initiated by the New York office of INS predicated upon a sixth preference petition filed in her behalf as a secretary, to sustain an application she filed seeking to adjust her immigration status to that of a lawful permanent resident alien. During the pendency of processing this application, Mrs. Riha had received an extension of her temporary stay to October 20, 1968, to complete a period of practical training.

On January 28, 1969, the New York office of this Service addressed a request to Hana Riha to appear for an interview on February 5, 1969. This letter was returned to the New York office bearing an endorsement by Hana Riha's aunt advising of Hana's marriage to a U. S. citizen on October 13, 1968, and her current address in Boulder, Colorado. Accordingly, the Service file was transferred to the Denver office for continuance of this inquiry.

The Service file of Mrs. Hana Riha contains a hand written memorandum dated March 7, 1969, indicating a Mrs. Tannenbaum had called regarding this case. Tannenbaum wanted to know what was necessary for approval of an immediate relative visa petition. Tannenbaum wanted to get it done right away since the husband (Thomas Riha) was getting a divorce from the alien (Mana Riha). Also of record in this file are typewritten letters addressed to the Denver office dated March 8 and 9, 1969, respectively and bearing a signature "Hana Riha" in which the writer, among other matters, designates Mrs. Tannenbaum as the person she desires to handle her business with the Immigration Service and that all correspondence relating thereto be directed to Tannenbaum's home address.

Cumulatively these letters allege that her marriage to Thomas Riha was induced by her Aunt, Mrs. Grassman, as a means of circumventing the immigration laws and establishing permanent residence status in the U. S. although she claims she is undecided as to whether in fact she desires to remain in the United States.

- 4. Q. What were the findings of Todd's inquiry?
  - A. Predicated upon the referenced letters (supra) and the fact that Mrs. Riha had overstayed her lawful admission, to wit, October 20, 1968, Pistrict Director Todd approved an epilication for an Order to Show Cause prepared by a Service investigator on March 10, 1969, and on March 11, 1969, issued and signed an Order to Show Cause and Notice of Hearing on Mrs. Riha charging her with being subject to deportation pursuant to the provisions of Section 241(a)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, in that, after admission as a nonimmigrant, she had remained in the United States for a longer time than permitted. This Order and Notice were served on Mrs. Riha by registered mail on March 11, 1969, directing her to appear for a hearing before a Special Inquiry Office on the charges, to be held at the Denver INS office at 2:00 P.M., Tuesday, March 25, 1969. On

March 21, 1969, the Denver office received a registered letter dated March 20, 1969, with enclosure in the form of a Notice of Appearance as attorney for Hana Riha, in which a continuance of the scheduled deportation hearing was requested and granted.

The file of Hana Riha contains a memorandum dated April 10, 1969, prepared for the file by then District Director Todd reporting that at 10:30 P.N. in the evening of April 9, 1969, he was telephonically contacted at his home by a reporter from the staff of the Colorado Daily, Colorado University, Boulder, Colorado, who advised he was preparing an article for his paper and desired some assistance. The reporter stated that a Mrs. Tannenbaum had informed him that she was employed in some capacity by the Immigration and Naturalization Service and that she had the authority to direct what disposition of Mrs. Riha's The reporter also stated that Professor Riba had disappeared two or three weeks before from the University and that Mrs. Tannenbaum had stated his disappearance was the result of activities by the secret police of three (3) foreign countries; that Mrs. Tannenbaum also claimed to have access to certain intelligence information in possession of the military author-In response to specific inquiries the reporter was advised: by District Director Todd to the effect that (1) a lirs. Gerald Tannenbaum is not and has never been, to his knowledge, an employee of INS (2) that he (Todd) had no idea of what her employment might be and (3) that he could give him (the reporter) no specific information regarding a Professor Riha, the alleged husband of subject Hans Riha. In conclusion, the memorandum suggests that the reporter might desire to contact Mrs. Riha's attorney since he had already mentioned the name of Mrs. Riha's attorney during the course of the conversation.

- 5. Q. Were these findings communicated to the CIA and the FBI?
  - A. A memorandum dated April 11, 1969, prepared by then Deputy District Director Lloyd D. Prowell and addressed to the file of Mana Riha reports that on April 10, 1969, Prowell telephonically contacted the Assistant Agent in Charge of the Denver office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and provided him with the substance of the information contained in District Director Todd's memorandum of April 10, 1969, (supra) and implies that such agent was requested to advise whether a contemplated investigation by INS would interfere with any actions which might be under consideration by the FBI.


On April 11, 1969, the Assistant Agent in Charge of the Denver FBI office telephonically advised Mr. Prowell that his office had a pending investigation on Mrs. Tannenbaum for alleged numerous impersonations of federal officials, but that investigation by INS would not interfere with their operations in this matter. He requested, however, that upon completion of any investigation by INS, his office be furnished a copy of the report.

Investigation was initiated on Eana Riba the same data. (April 11, 1969) A report of this investigation was prepared on April 23, 1969, and a copy of same was provided to the Denver office of the FBI pursuant to their request. No distribution of this report was made to the CIA.

- 6. Q. Why, in the fall of 1969, did the ING in Denver declared at all to an inquiry made by a friend of Ribath whether the professor still was alive? Why was this wife of Ribath then told it would be better if he wouldn't interested in the Riba case?
  - A. The Service files of Thomas and Hana Riha contain no recorded data indicating that an inquiry was directed to the Denver I'm office in the fall of 1969 by a friend of Professor Riha, inquiring as to whether he was still alive, nor any response to anyone advising "it would be better if he wouldn't be interested in the kiha case."

NOTE: Despite the absence of any record of the above inquiry, the declination to reply at all to same would have been entirely proper, should it have been made and not recorded. Professor Piha was naturalized a citizen of the United States in 1952 and there were no matters relating to him pending before and within the jurisdiction of INS.

- 7. Q. On what basis did the INS in Denver tell one of Riba's friends in May or June 1969 that Riba was alive? Who in the INS office in Denver made this report?
  - A. The Service files relating to Thomas and Hana Riha contain no recorded data that anyone in the Denver INS office advised any inquirer in May or June 1969, or at any other time, that Professor Riha was alive. Further, said files contain no factual information upon which such a response could be predicated.



- 8. Q. Were Riha or his wife, Mana, ever employed by the INS? When? For what purposes?
  - A. The official personnel files of INC disclose no record that Thomas or Hana Riha were ever employed by INS in any capacity at any time.
- 9. Q. Was the IN3 in contact with the FBI and the CIA on the Riha and Tannenbaum cases and the disturbance incident involving Mrs. Hana Riha at the Riha home in Boulder, Colorado, on the night of March 9, 1969?
  - A. The responses to questions #3 and 5 are also substantially responsive to this question and are incorporated by reference. There is no recorded material indicating any contact between this Cervice and the CIA with respect to Thomas Riha, Mrs. Tannenbeum or Mrs. Hana Riha within the time frame of the disturbance incident of March 9, 1969, or for that matter at any time during the year 1969. The CIA did contact this Service with respect to the Service files of Thomas and Mana Riha for the first time in early 1970.



## OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

NOV1 4 1975

TO: Leonard F. Chapman, Jr.

Commissioner, Immigration

and Naturalization Service

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.

Special Counsel for Intelligence

Coordination

SUBJECT: Request from the Senate Select Committee


on Intelligence

This Office has been directed by the Deputy Attorney General to coordinate all Justice Department responses to requests of the Senate and House Select Committees on Intelligence. Attached is a letter and questionnaire from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence requesting the Immigration and Naturalization Service to provide answers to questions concerning a certain Thomas Riha, former Associate Professor at the University of Colorado, who allegedly disappeared in 1969.

Copies of the Senate Select Committee's two previous requests for information on Riha are also attached for your information.

Please prepare responses to these questions at your <u>earliest</u> convenience and forward them in both classified and non-classified form to this Office for transmittal to the Senate Select Committee. Should you have any questions concerning this request, please do not hestitate to call upon this Office for assistance.

Your early cooperation in this matter is appreciated.





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Date	d by		 



## OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

NOV1 4 1975

TO: Leonard F. Chapman, Jr.

Commissioner, Immigration

and Naturalization Service

FROM:

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.

Special Counsel for Intelligence

Coordination

SUBJECT:

Request from the Senate Select Committee

on Intelligence


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File WF	in:	C0	
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1.	Does	the	FBI	ķnow	the	whereabouts	of,	Rihawhether	he	is
	alive	e or	dead	1? WI	nere'	?				

- 2. Was Riha known to the Agency? If so, when first known and why?
- 3. Was Riha employed by FBI? If so, in what capacity? Dates of employment?
- Tannenbaum of Denver and Boulder, Colorado, contact the FBI in Colorado or Washington to assure the FBI that missing University of Colorado Professor Thomas Riha was alive and well and had left his home for personal reasons on March 15, 1969? If so, who in the FBI received this information and to whom was this information passed on in the FBI and the

5	Was	this	or	other	informa	ation	passed	on	bу	the	FBI	to	the		
		or to	2 01	her a	rencies	and t	the Don	702	າກຕໍ	l Rot	11 dox		JFI	K Act	6 (1)(

What was the information conveyed? When was this done?

When was this done?

- that it conducted no investigation of Riha's disappearance when it is known that FBI agents talked in 1969 and 1970 with friends of Riha about his disappearance?
- 7. Why, in January or February 1970, did an FBI agent at the

  Denver office refuse to accompany Agent Agent

from Boulder to see then Denver District Attorney Mike McKevitt?

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-NW-55101 DocId:32989554 Page 29

Was it made known by the CIA agent that the purpose of the visit was to ease the pressure on issuance of a subpoena to Dr. Joseph Smiley, former president of the University of Colorado? (Under such a subpoena, Smiley might have been required to reveal the agency that had given him the April 1969 report that Riha was alive and well at that time.)

- Cook of Taunus, West Germany, contacted the FBI in Washington about her missing son, she was very anxious to "do anything" to determine where he was and what had happened to him. Yet the FBI (J. Edgar Hoover) said in December 1969, that Mrs. Cook declined the FBI's offer to place a missing persons notice on Riha in the FBI bulletin. What information did the FBI furnish Mrs. Cook to lead her to make this unlikely decision not to pursue all possible ways to find out what happened to her son?
- 9. Was Dr. Cook connected with the FBI in any way at any time?
  In what capacity? . When?
- 10. Was Mrs. Gloria (Galya) Tannenbaum ever employed by the FBI?

  For what purpose or purposes? Was she hired to check on

  Leonard Carlin, Chicago attorney who was active in defend
  ing antiwar activists in the 1960s?
- 11. Was Mrs. Tannenbaum sent by the FBI from Chicago to the Boulder-Denver, Colorado area in 1968 to check on Riha or on Boulder attorney Dennis Blewitt, who later became Riha's attorney and confidant?

- What knowledge does the FBI have on Riha's translations of Czechoslovakian tapes for Mrs. Tannenbaum in March 1969, before he disappeared?
- What knowledge does the FBI have on Tannenbaum's reported 13. suicide at the Colorado State Hospital in March 1971? the FBI acquainted directly or indirectly with Henry Madrid, a technician at the hospital?
- 14. Did the FBI contact the Colorado Bureau of Investigation at any time on the Riha disappearance, Mrs. Tannenbaum's death or any other aspect/of the Riha-Tannenbaum case? so, when were these contacts and what was their extent?
- Did the FBI have any contacts with Riha when he was working 15. as an interpreter/in/the Army in the early 1950's?
- Does the FBI have files on any of the following persons, 16. or were any of them at any time employed by the FBI directly or indirectly or contacted by the FBI, and for what reason?

Mrs. Jan (Kenneth) Sorensen - Boulder, Colorado Zdenek Cerveny - Boulder, Colorado

Mrs. Carol Word - Littleton, Colorado

George and Francesca Stein - Lyons, Colorado

Professor Donald Fanger - Cambridge, Massachusetts

Henry Madrid - Pueblo, Colorado

Professor Stephen Fischer-Galati - Boulder, Colorado

Harvey Bevier - Denver, Colorado

Professor Oldrich Leska - Prague, Czechoslovakia

Jaroslav Riha - San Antonio, Texas

Professor Joyce Lebra - Boulder, Colorado

- 17. Does the FBI have knowledge about Riha's connections with the Treasure Tours International Travel Agency in Montreal, Canada, and what is the significance of this connection?
- 18. Does the FBI have knowledge of Riha's connections with the World University Service in Chicago and with Susan Kresge, one of the officials of this organization?
- 19. Were FBI agents trailing Riha early in 1969, especially in late February and early March? If so, why?

- 1. Was Mrs. Gloria (Galya) Tannenbaum of Denver and Boulder, Colorado, ever employed directly or indirectly by the INS? When? In what capacity?
- 2. Was Mrs. Tannenbaum ever hired by INS in connection with the visa status of Riha's wife, Mrs. Hana Riha, formerly Hana Hrushkova or Hrushkovnova?
- 3. What inquiry was made by John L. Todd, INS district director in Denver, after he received a call early on the morning of March 9, 1969, involving a disturbance at the Thomas Riha home in Boulder, Colorado? The disturbance involved Riha, Mrs. Tannenbaum and Mrs. Hana Riha and ether placed in Mrs. Riha's bedroom, apparently to overcome her.
- 4. What were the findings of Todd's inquiry?
- 5. Were these findings communicated to the CIA and the FBI?
- 6. Why, in the fall of 1969, did the INS in Denver decline to reply at all to an inquiry made by a friend of Riha's on whether the professor still was alive? Why was this friend of Riha's then told it would be better if he wouldn't be interested in the Riha case?
- 7. On what basis did the INS in Denver tell one of Riha's friends in May or June 1969 that Riha was alive? Who in the INS office in Denver made this report?
- 8. Were Riha or his wife, Hana, ever employed by the INS?
  When? For what purpose or purposes?

9. Was the INS in contact with the FBI and the CIA on the Riha and Tannenbaum cases and the disturbance incident involving Mrs. Hana Riha at the Riha home in Boulder, Colorado, on the night of March 9, 1969?

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 MAY 1962 EDITION GSA FPMR (42:CFR) 101-11.6 UNITED STATES GO Memorandum MR. CALLAHAN

H. E. HOXIE

TO

SUBJECT:

DATE:

Dep. AD A Dep. AD Inv. Asst. Dir.:

Admin.

Comp. Syst. Ext. Affairs

Files & Com Gen. Inv.

11 - 26 - 75

Ident. Inspection Intell.

Laboratory Legal Coun.

Plan. & Eval.

Spec. Inv. Training Telephone Rm. \_

Director Sec'y

TESTIMONY BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

BEFORE THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to Legal Counsel memorandum to Mr. Adams dated 11-24-75 which requested the Office of Planning and Evaluation to preparé material concerning proposals involving possible organizational changes of the FBI. Attached are individual write-ups on the following topics:

> Tenure of the FBI Director Transfer of Drug Enforcement Responsibilities to the FBI Office of Special Review, Department of Justice Separation of Intelligence Gathering from Law Enforcement Functions The Relationship of the FBI Director to the Attorney General The Assignment of FBI Agents to Foreign Liaison Posts The FBI as an Independent Agency

The matters listed below were also given consideration. After deliberation it was concluded that they either were inappropriate or did not meet the criteria.

> FBI Laboratory Training of State and Local Technicians Department of Justice Consolidated Training Computer Message Switching Guidelines for Collection, Dissemination and Retention of Information Department Guidelines for Prosecution of Criminal Cases and

Parameters for Security Cases Appointment of Media Representatives in Each Field Office Apportionment of FBI Intelligence Gathering Responsibility into Separate Divisions EC-48

Use of Personnel Policy FBI Files and Their Disclosure

Creation of Civilian Review Board to Monitor the FBI, Relationship Between the FBI and Other Departments and Agencies of the Federal Government

RECOMMENDATION: None. For information.

RWC:crt (6) INFORMATION CONTAINED 1 - Mr. Adams 1 - Mr. Jenkins Tills 300 8 SP

1 - Mr. Mintz (Attention: Mr. Hotis)

1 - Mr. Hoxie

Enc.

3 Masses Buy U.S. Sayings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

TOPIC: SEPARATION OF INTELLIGENCE GATHERING FROM LAW ENFORCEMENT FUNCTIONS

The question has been raised regarding the feasibility of separating the intelligence gathering function of the FBI from the law enforcement function of the FBI.

The functions of the FBI do not neatly fall within
"intelligence" and "law enforcement" categories. Internal security
cases are both intelligence and law enforcement operations and
counterintelligence sometimes involves arrests and prosecutions,
i.e., law enforcement. Thus, the functions of the FBI can more
accurately be broken down into three general missions - law
enforcement, internal security (domestic), and counterintelligence
(foreign). These missions are separate, distinct, and distinguishable
functions, even though each partakes a little of each other.

While counterintelligence could adequately, and with more success in some cases, be handled by an organization totally separate from one with law enforcement powers, internal security work in many cases, is directly related to criminal prosecution.

Complete separation, at least of the internal security function from law enforcement, does not appear to be practically feasible.

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Separation of the internal security function also presents serious political considerations. Internal security is the most controversial of government's intelligence collection activities. In the U.S., this function was originally given to the FBI which had established for itself a reputation for being responsible, competent, and most importantly, politically neutral and had the confidence of most Americans. It is to the advantage of an internal security agency, which is subjected to political pressures, to be somewhat insulated by being part of a larger, respected organization which has a high profile as a competent and fair investigative agency in the less politically complex law enforcement and counterintelligence fields. Adding to this insulation is the tradition of FBI political independence, and the new Congressional concern with keeping the FBI politically independent. While the law enforcement and counterintelligence wings of the FBI dislike the controversies into which its internal security wings drag the FBI name. separation of internal security into a separate agency would probably subject it to more intense political pressures, both from within the administration and without, which pressures it might not be capable of withstanding. Such separation appears politically unfeasible and undesirable.

NW 55101 DocId:32989554 Page 37

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Separation of the counterintelligence function would be more practically feasible; however, the commingling of counterintelligence and internal security interests and the threat of a merger of the counterintelligence function with the positive foreign intelligence collection agency, especially in the U.S., are both practical and political reasons militating against this course.

Practical considerations against divestiture of the counterintelligence and internal security functions from the FBI are that: basic criminal investigative experience equips men in many areas to be intelligence officers; a pool of trained criminal investigators is available to the intelligence missions to draw from, either on an ad hoc emergency basis, e.g., seizure of an embassy or political kidnapping or skyjacking, or as candidates for the position of intelligence officer; a divestiture might result in the loss to the counterintelligence and internal security wings of the effective use of the FBI name, reputation, and contacts/sources built-up over the years using the FBI name.

All members of the intelligence community have specific responsibilities defined by statutes and executive orders. The FBI maintains close daily liaison with other agencies to insure against



repetition or overlapping activities. The Congress and the Executive Branch, in establishing intelligence agencies such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Agency, FBI, etc., must have considered the need to keep each agency's functions separate. The CIA, for example, is specifically prohibited from having any internal security or law enforcement functions. For this reason, in addition to consideration of experience, efficiency and economy, the FBI recommends that all three missions of law enforcement, internal security, and counterintelligence remain with the FBI.

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TOPIC: THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE FBI DIRECTOR
TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

The FBI, through Congressional enactment, Executive Order, and directive of the Attorney General has been charged with the responsibility of performing certain duties subject to the general supervision and direction of the Attorney General. The Director of the FBI, a Bureau chief within the Department, having been granted enormous responsibility, must attain a proper balance between independence and responsiveness in order to properly discharge this responsibility.

The Director of the FBI must be permitted to discharge his responsibilities free from political or unethical pressure. This must be balanced with his responsibility to remain responsive to the Attorney General's leadership and direction. A Congressional oversight committee, available to give the FBI counsel, guidance, and direction, can greatly assist the FBI in achieving and maintaining this balance.

There must be an efficient working relationship, with free and open channels of communication, between the Director and the Attorney General. However, the FBI Director must also on occasion communicate directly with the President and members of the Congressional oversight committee. The Director must be in a position to register reasoned disagreement with the Attorney General and if the situation dictates, to take up important matters of disagreement with the President and the Congressional oversight committee.

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TOPIC: THE ASSIGNMENT OF FBI AGENTS TO FOREIGN LIAISON POSTS

The FBI has had FBI Agents serving in foreign liaison posts since 1940. They are known as Legal Attaches and are regularly called upon to secure in-depth cooperation from foreign agencies on criminal and security matters which are frequently of a complicated and sensitive nature. In order to handle such matters effectively, it is often required that a Legal Attache be proficient in the language of the foreign country involved and should have some familiarity with the culture, customs and judicial processes. Simultaneously, it is obviously advantageous to have a thorough knowledge of FBI jurisdiction, regulations, and policies. This knowledge can only be achieved through years of experience as an FBI Agent.

In order to maintain the cooperation of foreign agencies, Legal Attaches assist these agencies by having investigations conducted in the United States concerning matters of interest to the foreign countries involved.

Several options in lieu of maintaining FBI Agents in foreign countries have been suggested. These include the assignment of Embassy personnel to handle FBI work, to have FBI interests abroad handled by other law enforcement agencies which maintain foreign liaison offices,

NW 55101 DocId:32989554 Page 41

and the discontinuance of FBI pursuit of foreign ramifications in criminal and security responsibilities by FBI personnel and conduct the investigations through direct communications. All of these alternatives pose serious problems including security risks, lack of expertise and knowledge of FBI procedures and policies, etc.

The FBI has found it necessary and, in fact, through experience it has been demonstrated it is invaluable to have a man stationed abroad who can insure that prompt and efficient action is taken and that cooperative relationships are nurtured and protected. Accomplishments attained by the FBI through the liaison activities of the Legal Attaches with foreign law enforcement agencies have been numerous, and it is firmly believed that these successes would not have occurred in the absence of personal and direct FBI liaison with foreign police agencies.

The FBI currently has Agents stationed in 15 American diplomatic establishments outside the United States.


TOPIC: THE FBI AS AN INDEPENDENT AGENCY

The proposal to make the FBI an independent agency within the Executive Branch has been voiced on several occasions in Congress. Approximately one year ago, two bills were introduced in the Senate to achieve this aim.

Proponents of this proposal indicate their basis for supporting this approach is because of their concern to have the FBI free from political influence. They cite as an argument the fact the Attorney General is almost always a political appointee of the President whose views generally conform with his own.

The question arises whether removal of the FBI from the Department of Justice is the proper means of assuring a justifiable degree of independence and freedom from undue political pressure. The FBI as an independent agency would simply mean the Director would no longer report to the Attorney General but instead would be responsible directly to the White House.

Opponents of the proposed Senate bills suggest that some danger does exist in the FBI's reporting to a political appointee, but a far greater danger may exist if the FBI, performing as an independent agency, became the arm of a politically motivated Director who was primarily responsible to the White House.



62-116275-1190

It is the FBI's position the FBI should remain a Bureau within the Department of Justice where it can properly perform its functions to investigate violations of various Federal laws and report its impartial findings to those who will conduct the prosecution of these violations in our judicial system.

NW 55101 DocId:32989554 Page 44

#### FBI

		Date: 11/11/75
Tran	nsmit the following	in(Type in plaintext or code)
Via	AIRTEL	AIRMAIL - REGISTERED (Priority)
	TO:	DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395) ATTN: INTD (W. O. CREGAR)
	FROM:	SAC, BIRMINGHAM (66-2204)
	SUBJECT:	SENSTUDY 75
	40	REBUCAL, 11/10/75.
	i. Li	Enclosed are copies of the following:
	(1)	Birmingham file 170-9 regarding GARY THOMAS ROWE. (3 volumes)
	(2)	Birmingham file 170-9-SF (3 volumes) concerning GARY THOMAS ROWE.
	(3)	Pertinent information located in file of United Klans of America, Inc., regarding BH 248-R (former).
	(4)	Pertinent information located in file concerning EUGENE THOMAS; ET AL; VIOLA LIUZZO, AKA; ET AL - VICTIMS, regarding BH 248-R (former).
		EX-115 REC 12
	. 0	Nov 13 1975
	S Puras	u (Encls. 8)
	3 - Birmi (1 - (1 -	ngham 66-2204) 157-4602)(UKA)
	(1 - ALB:hss (5)	44-1236) (LIUZZOALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11/13 ODOO BY SPORMATION
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★ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1969 O - 346-090 (11)

UNCLASSIFIED INTERNAL PROCESSING ONLY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION (IF ANY) CONTRACT NUMBER TRANSMITTAL OF MATERIAL Acknowledge receipt of this material by executing and returning the below receipt. NUMBER ARFCO upon removal of the inclosures 2. This transmittal may be\_ and physical removal of the caveat notation. E.D. DAJE TIME OF MATERIAL (GMT) FROM (station no.) DTG OF PREP CONTROL/RECEIPT NO. V35-022-75 🗓 November 1975 DIRNSA RECEIPT ш REMARKS MR. PAUL V. DALY MR. DAVID D. LOWMA PROCESS OFFICE OF THE LEGAL COUNSEL SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR (EWD BY FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION NSA NSOC) CONGRESSIONAL WEIGHT PA. AVE BTWN 9TH & NOTH NW REVIEWS WASHINGTON, D.C. NSA COPYNUMBERS OR RECORDING SERIAL ITEM TYPE TITLE OR CATEGORY NO. NUMBERS (bundle) -DIRECTOR'S CORRESPONDENCE--62-111395 NOT RECORDED DEC 17 1075 Perplace 1595 poinsel ALL INFORMATION CONTAINS Herein is unclassified NAME (Type or Print) SIGNATURE JUDY LEE, SECRETARY TO NSA SOO, NSOC FORM A1295 REV JUN 73 (Supersedes A1295 DEC 68) SECURITY CLASSIFICATION (IF ANY) NW 55101 DocId:32989554 Page 46 UNCLASSIFIED

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 MAY 1962 EDITION GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27 5010-104 UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

Mr. W. R. Wannall

FROM

1 - Administrative D

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannal

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

CONTINUED - OVER

DATE: 10/7/75

Assoc. Dir. Dep. AD Adra. Dep. AD Inv. \_ Asst. Dir.: Admin . . Comp. Syst. Ext. Affairs Files & Com. ~a. Inv. . Gent. Inspection Intell. Laboratory Legal Coun. Plan. & Eval. Spec. Inv. Training \_ Telephone Rm. Director Sec'y.

This is to recommend an individual letter commendation from the Director for L. Patricia Sim Christine A. Weldon, Gerry L. Winslow and Mary E."

of the Intelligence Division, for the outstanding manner in which they performed duties assigned to them in connection with a Senstudy special on Sunday, 10/5/75. In addition. it is recommended than a general letter of commendation be sent to the Intelligence Division for the work performed by the following Bureau supervisors during approximately a 10-hour period on 10/5/75: John W. Dalseg, Andrew J. Duffin, Jim R. Freeman, Richard F. Green, Michael J. Jeweler,

62-116395

WOC:1hb (22)

1 - Personnel File L., Patricia Simmons

1 - Personnel File Christine A. Weldom

1 - Personnel File Gerry L. Winslow

1 - Personnel File Mary E. Dodge REC-3

1 - Personnel File SA John W. Dalseg 62-176375. 1 - Personnel File SA Andrew J. Duffin

1 - Personnel File SA Jim R. Freeman

1 - Personnel File SA Richard F. Green

1 - Personnel File SA Michael J. Jeweler

1 - Personnel File SA Blaime K. Katz

1 - Personnel File SA Richard G. Kinsey

1 - Personnel File SA William J. Lander

1 - Personnel File SA Rodney K. McHargue

1 - Personnel File SA William F. Moran

1 - Personnel File SA Alfred K. Nicholas,

1 - Personnel File SA Richard H. Ross

1 - Personnel File SA John P. Thomas

1 - Personnel File SA John A. Van Wagenen

1 JANEnclosures - letters sent 10 /22 /70-/6

DEC ALL INFORMAT

139

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall

Re: Senstudy 75

62-116395

Blaine K. Katz, Richard G. Kinsey, William J. Lander, Rodney K. McHargue, William F. Moran, Alfred K. Nicholas, Jr., Richard H. Ross, John P. Thomas, and John A. Van Wagenen.

At approximately 7:00 p.m. on Saturday evening, 10/4/75, I received a call from Special Agent Paul V. Daly of the Legal Counsel Division. Mr. Daly advised that the Attorney General (AG) had requested the Bureau immediately prepare a list of electronic surveillances conducted by the Bureau from 1/1/70 until 6/30/75. In addition, the AG requested that the supportive documents underlying these electronic surveillance requests also be provided him. Both the list and supportive documents were to be on the desk of the AG by 9:00 a.m., 10/6/75.

After a series of calls, arrangements were made with the Files and Communications Division to begin pulling the necessary files needed to prepare the list and provide the supportive documents. At 9:30 a.m., the above-named Bureau supervisors reported to the Intelligence Division where they worked steadily, without taking time out for lunch or dinner until approximately 9:00 p.m., developing the necessary information and documents responsive to the AG's request.

Miss Winslow and Miss Dodge, secretaries in the Intelligence Division, along with Miss Simmons and Mrs. Weldon, typists in the Intelligence Division, reported for work at approximately 11:00 a.m. These 4 young ladies worked continuously through the afternoon and well into the evening hours preparing the necessary communications for the AG. Not only did they perform in an admirable fashion but they exhibited an outstanding attitude and suffered considerable physical exhaustion prior to their departure for the day at approximately

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall

Re: Senstudy 75

62-116395

10:00 p.m. Without the outstanding performance of these 4 young ladies, it would have been impossible for this Division to meet the AG's deadline.

It is interesting to note that the Intelligence Division was successful in meeting the deadline and had the necessary material available for the AG at 9:00 a.m., on the morning of 10/6/75.

#### **RECOMMENDATIONS:**

- 1. In view of the outstanding manner in which L. Patricia Simmons, Christine A. Weldon, Gerry L. Winslow and Mary E. Dodge performed, it is recommended that each receive a letter of commendation from the Director.
- 2. That a general letter of commendation be sent the Assistant Director, Intelligence Division, for the manner in which Bureau supervisors in the Intelligence Division performed and that a copy of that general letter be designated for the personnel files of those Bureau supervisors mentioned in the first paragraph of this memorandum.

way Tour

Appropriate letters attached 10-22-75

10/9/75 Ma. Crecon, Div. 5,
Advised chanical employers
Simons, Weldow, Winslow &
Dodge were appropriately
Componsated for their

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EW/RGH

- 3 -

overtime duty. fr. NW 55101 DocId:32989554 Page 49

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRM

PHILIP A. HART, MICH. WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN. WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY. ROBERT MORGAN, N.C. GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN. BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ. CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD. RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

### United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, MATH CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

December 15, 1975

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq. Öffice of the Deputy Attorney General 🧥 U. S. Department of Justice (Sonaturly Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Mike:

Enclosed is a package of documents relating to FBI COINTELPRO activity against various Ku Klux Klan The Committee requests that these materials be reviewed by the FBI for possible public release. Excisions necessary to protect FBI sources and ongoing investigations should be indicated by brackets.

Mr. Walter Ricks of the Committee staff, will be in contact with FBI representatives regarding this matter.

Sincerely,

John T. Elliff

Director

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Domestic Intelligence Task Force


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Page 50 32989554

62-116395





December 12, 1975

John A. Mintz, Assistant, Director TO: Legal Counsel Division Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM:

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr. Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination

Senate Select Committee Request

Attached is a Senate Select Committee request dated December 8, and received by this Office on December 10. Since the letter indicates a copy to Mr. Paul Daly of the Bureau, I assume an appropriate response is being prepared.

Paul Daly cc:

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62-116393

December 12, 1975

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director

Legal Counsel Division

Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.


Special Counsel for Intelligence

Coordination

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee Request

Attached is a Senate Select Committee request dated December 8, and received by this Office on December 10. Since the letter indicates a copy to Mr. Paul Daly of the Bureau, I assume an appropriate response is being prepared.

cc: Paul Daly



FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.

WALTER P. MONDALES, MAN.

WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.

GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.

BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.

CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.

RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

## Mnited States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO 3. HES. 21, HTH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

December 8, 1975

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq. Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination Office of the Deputy Attorney General U. S. Department of Justice Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mike:

The Select Committee requests that limited staff access be provided to all materials in the possession of the FBI and the Justice Department reflecting the dissemination of information by the FBI from the wiretaps authorized by Attorney General Robert Kennedy in connection with the investigation of lobbying activities in 1961 and 1962. The procedures will be the same as those used for staff access to similar materials pertaining to the so-called "17 wiretaps" under the Nixon Administration.

This request should be handled on a priority basis and expedited accordingly.

Sincerely,

John T. Elliff John T. Elliff

Director

Domestic Intelligence Task Force APPAIRS
OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE APPAIRS

cc: Mr. Paul Daly

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DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE R

BEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE R

R.A.O.

DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL

ENCLOSURE, 62 -1/6395 - 1184

,	FB!
nsmit the followin	Date: 11/26/75
nsmit the followin	g in(Type in plaintext or code)
AIR TEL	1
	(Priority)
TO:	DIRECTOR, FBI Attention: Office of Legal Counsel
FROM:	SAC, KANSAS CITY (66-4080)
RE: /	SENSTUDY 75
represe Justice	Enclosed for the Bureau is a memorandum from SA JAMES P. HOSTY, JR., wherein he requests entation by counsel from the U. S. Department of during the course of his interview by staff of the Senate Select Committee.
2 Bur 1 - Kan BDW/hmg (3)	reau (enc. 1) ENCLOSURE usas City  12/1/75 62= Tom Martin, Civil Div. was advised.  He will arrange for attorney for Hosty. Am  REC 17  REC 17  22. 086 _ 1978
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Sent .

U.S.Government Printing Office: 1972 — 455-574

AIR TEL AIR MAIL

TO:

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DIRECTOR, FBI

Attention: Office of Legal Counsel

FROM:

SAC, KANSAS CITY (66-4080)

RE:

SENSTUDY 75

Enclosed for the Bureau is a memorandum to me from SA JAMES P. HOSTY, JR., wherein he requests representation by counsel from the U. S. Department of Justice during the course of his interview by staff members of the Senate Select Committee.

2- Bureau (enc. 1) 1 - Kansas City BDW/hmg (3)

# $\it Iemorandum$

TO

SAC, KANSAS CITY

DATE:

11/26/75

FROM

SA JAMES P. HOSTY, JR.

SUBJECT:

SENSTUDY 75

In connection with my interview by members of the Senate Select Committee on 12/4/75, I hereby request representation by counsel from the U.S. Department of Justice.

JPH/hmg



ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFI MOR-IL

TO: ALL SACS AND LEGATS

12/10/75

)

FROM: DIRECTOR, FBI

DIRECTOR'S APPEARANCE BEFORE SENATE SELECT CONTLITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, DECEMBER 10, 1975

A COPY OF THE STATEMENT I DELIVERED BEFORE THE SENATURE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES TODAY HAS BEEN SENT ALL OFFICES. FOR YOUR INFORMATION, THERE FOLLOWS A SYNOPSIZED ACCOUNT OF THE MAJOR AREAS OF THE COMMITTEE'S OUESTIONS TO ME. TOGETHER WITH MY RESPONSES:

(1) REGARDING FBI INFORMANTS, QUESTIONS WERE ASKED WHETHER COURT APPROVAL SHOULD BE REQUIRED FOR FBI USE OF INFORMANTS IN INVESTIGATIONS OF ORGANIZATIONS (MY RESPONSE WAS THAT THE CONTROLS WHICH EXIST TODAY OVER USE OF INFORMANTS ARE SATISFACTORY); HOW CAM FBI KEEP IMPORMANTS OPERATING WITHIN PROPER LIMITS SO THEY DO NOT INVADE RIGHTS OF OTHER PERSONS (MY RESPONSE WAS THAT RELIANCE MUST BE PLACED ON THE INDIVIDUAL AGENTS HANDLING INFORMANTS AND THOSE SUPERVISING THE AGENTS' WORK, THAT INFORMANTS WHO VIOLATE THE LAW CAN BE N

- the or singulation in it ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED MUNICATIONS, SECTION HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE III IS IONO BYSON Assoc. Dir. DATELL Dep. AD Adm. \_ MDR-14 Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_ Asst. Dir.: 1 - Mr. Callahan Admin. 1 - Mr. Adams Comp. Syst. \_ 1 - Mr. Jenkins Ext. Affairs \_ Files & Com. \_\_ DEC 121975 1 - Each Assistant Director Gen. Inv. \_ Purpose of this teletype is to furnish brief symopsis, to Inspection \_\_ Intell. Laboratory \_ Plan. & Eval. \_ Spec. Inv. \_\_ Training \_\_\_ Legal Coun. \_ Telephone Rm. TELETYPE UNIT GPO 954-346 PAGE TWO - DIRECTOR'S APPEARANCE BEFORE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, DECEMBER 10, 1975

PROSECUTED -- AS CAN ANY AGENT WHO COUNSELS AN INFORMANT TO COMMIT VIOLATIONS); AND DID FORMER KLAN INFORMANT GARY ROWE TESTIFY ACCURATELY WHEN HE TOLD THE COMMITTEE ON DECEMBER 2 THAT HE INFORMED FBI OF PLANNED ACTS OF VIOLENCE BUT FBI DID NOT ACT TO PREVENT THEM (MY RESPONSE WAS THAT ROWE'S TESTIMONY WAS NOT ACCURATE).

- (2) IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS REGARDING IMPROPER

  CONDUCT BY FBI EMPLOYEES, I STATED THAT ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF

  LAW BY FBI PERSONNEL SHOULD BE INVESTIGATED BY THE FBI OR

  OTHER APPROPRIATE AGENCY; THAT THE INSPECTION DIVISION HAS

  CONDUCTED INQUIRIES REGARDING ALLEGATIONS OF MISCONDUCT;

  THAT AN OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY HAS JUST

  BEEN ESTABLISHED IN THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT, AND WE WILL ADVISE

  THAT OFFICE OF OUR MAJOR INVESTIGATIONS OF DEPARTMENTAL PERSONNEL,

  INCLUDING FBI EMPLOYEES, FOR ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF LAW, REGULATIONS,

  OR STANDARDS OF CONDUCT; THAT I WOULD RESERVE COMMENT

  REGARDING POSSIBLE CREATION OF A NATIONAL INSPECTOR GENERAL

  TO CONSIDER MATTERS OF MISCONDUCT BY EMPLOYEES OF ANY FEDERAL

  AGENCY.
- (3) IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS CONCERNING HARASSMENT OF
  MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., I STATED THAT THE PERSONS WHO ISSUED
  THE ORDERS WHICH RESULTED IN SUCH HARASSMENT SHOULD FACE THE

PAGE THREE - DIRECTOR'S APPEARANCE BEFORE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, DECEMBER 10, 1975

RESPONSIBILITY FOR IT, RATHER THAN THOSE UNDER THEM WHO CARRIED OUT SUCH ORDERS IN GOOD FAITH; THAT THE FBI STILL HAS RECORDINGS RESULTING FROM ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCES OF KING; THAT WE RETAIN RECORDINGS FOR TEN YEARS BUT WE ALSO HAVE AGREED TO A REQUEST FROM THE SENATE NOT TO DESTROY INFORMATION IN OUR FILES WHILE CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES ARE BEING CONDUCTED; THAT I HAVE NOT REVIEWED THE KING TAPES; THAT IF THE COMMITTEE REQUESTED TO REVIEW THE KING TAPES, THE REQUEST WOULD BE REFERRED TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL.

- (4) IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS REGARDING WHETHER IT WOULD BE ADVANTAGEOUS TO SEPARATE THE FBI CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES AND OUR INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS, I STATED THAT WE HAVE FOUND THE TWO AREAS TO BE COMPATIBLE, AND I FEEL THE FBI IS DOING A SPLENDID JOB IN BOTH AREAS.
- OF CONTROLS ON REQUESTS FROM THE WHITE HOUSE AND FROM OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES FOR FBI INVESTIGATIONS OR FOR INFORMATION FROM OUR FILES, I STATED THAT WHEN SUCH REQUESTS ARE MADE ORALLY, THEY SEOULD BE CONFIRMED IN WRITING; THAT WE WOULD WELCOME ANY LEGISLATIVE GUIDELINES THE CONGRESS FEELS WOULD PROTECT THE FBI FROM THE POSSIBILITY OF PARTISAN MISUSE.

A FULL TRANSCRIPT OF THE QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS WILL BE FURNISHED TO EACH OFFICE AS SOON AS IT IS AVAILABLE.





December 9, 1975

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director

Legal Counsel Division Federal Bureau of Invest

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr. Special Counsel for Intelligence

Coordination

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee Request

> Attached is a letter from the Senate Select Committee dated December 8, 1975. Please prepare an appropriate response to this request.

> > ISTATIO

cc: Paul Daly

/ ENCLOSUR

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December 9, 1975

John A. Mintz, Assistant Director Legal Counsel Division TO:

Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.

Special Counsel for Intelligence

Coordination

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee Request

Attached is a letter from the Senate Select Committee dated December 8, 1975. Please prepare an appropriate response to this request.

cc: Paul Daly

Frank Church Idaho, Chairman John G. Tower, Texas, Vice Chairman Bet. Mich. . Howard H. Baker. II

PHILIP A. HART, MICH. WALTER F. MONDALL, MINN. WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY. ROBERT MORGAN, N.C. GARY HART, COLO.

Howard H. Baker, Jr., Tenn. Barry Golowater, Ariz. Charles MC G. Mathias, Jr., MD. Richard S. Schweiker, Pa.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

## United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)

Washington, D.C. 20510

December 8, 1975

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Mike:

This document request consists of three parts.

#### I. FBI Informants

Please provide copies of all memoranda, records and other materials reflecting conversations, interviews, reports, communications between former FBI informant William Divale and any personnel of the FBI during 1968 which pertained in any way to Walter Crowe and/or Sirhan Sirhan.

#### II. FBI Laboratory

Please provide such portions of the 1971 Inspection Report on the Laboratory Divison as to pertain to intelligence and counterintelligence operations and activities of the FBI.

#### III. Martin Luther King, Jr.

With respect to Mr. Sizoo's unserialized December 1, 1964 memorandum to Mr. Sullivan captioned "Martin Luther Kings," Jr.", which was forwarded by Mr. Shaheen in response to Items 3 and 4 of the SSC Letter of 11/7/75, please forward:

- a. Mr. Sullivan's "informal memo" which is referred to in the first paragraph;
- b. The facts and circumstances surrounding the lining out of certain portions of the first and third paragraphs;

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Michael E. Shaheen, Jr. Page 2

December 8, 1975

- c. Access to Mr. Sizoo's December 1, 1964 memorandum in its original form;
- d. All memoranda and any other materials which pertain to the suggestions or implementation of the suggestions, contained in Mr. Sizoo's December 1, 1964 memorandum.

Your continued cooperation is appreciated.

Sincerely,

John T. Elliff

Director

Domestic Intelligence Task Force





WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

December 8, 1975

TO: John A./Mintz, Assistant Director

Legal Counsel Division

Federál Bureau of Investigation

Michael E. Shaheen, Ur.

Special Counsel for Intelligence

Coordination

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee Request

> Attached is a Senate Select Committee request seeking delivery of certain Bureau materials. Please prepare an appropriate response.

I invite your attention to paragraph numbered 4 which amends an earlier request of the Committee (Elliff letter of November 25, 1975, Item 6c) which request was the subject of a telephone conversation on December 3, with Mr. Seymor Phillips of the Bureau.

cc: Paul Daly

ST-110

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62-116395

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director

Legal Counsel Division

Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.

Special Counsel for Intelligence

Coordination

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee Request

Attached is a Senate Select Committee request seeking delivery of certain Bureau materials. Please prepare an appropriate response.

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cc: Paul Daly

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JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
IT, MICH.
SIDALE, MINN.
JODLESTON, KY.
SAN, N.C.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAMS, MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR FATDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN

## United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(pursuant to s. res. 21, 14th congress)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

December 4, 1975

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Mike:

The Senate Select Committee requests the following materials for delivery.

- 1. Delivery of all materials pertaining to the circumstances surrounding the recommendation for, authorization of, and duration and termination of the electronic surveillance referred to in Items 1 and 22 of my letter of November 21, 1975 and in materials delivered to the Committee on December 1, 1975.
- 2. Delivery of a copy of the letter to Mr. Bill Moyers, Special Assistant to the President, dated October 27, 1964, and materials reflecting that this letter was hand delivered by Mr. Cartha DeLoach on October 28, 1964.
- 3. Delivery of all materials pertaining to the surveillances of Mrs. Anna Chennault in October and November, 1968.

The Committee's request in my letter of November 27, 1975, item 6c should be revised to read as follows: "All memoranda and any other materials which pertain to, bear upon, or indicate any actions taken pursuant to or in connection with the recommendation contained in this memornadum, including a summary of the recommendations of relevant Bureau personnel pertaining thereto."

Sincerely

62-116375- 117

NW 55101 DocId:32989554

Page 66

December 8, 1975

1

John A. Mintz, Assistant Director

Legal Counsel Division Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM:

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.

Special Counsel for Intelligence

Coordination

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee Request

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I invite your attention to paragraph numbered 4 which amends an earlier request of the Committee (Elliff letter of November 25, 1975, Item 6c) which request was the subject of a telephone conversation on December 3, with Mr. Seymor Phillips of the Bureau.

cc: Paul Daly

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United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH

RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. (PURSUANT TO S. RCS. 21, 11TH CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

December 4, 1975

· Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq. .. Special Counsel for Intelligence

Coordination

20530

Office of the Deputy Attorney General U. S. Department of Justice

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·Washington, D.C.

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Mr. J. A. Mintz (1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis) 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall 1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar 1 - Mr. H. W. Porter

62-116395

December 8, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: REQUEST PERTAINING TO AUTHORIZATION AND PURPOSE OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCES CONDUCTED BY THE FBI

Reference is made to the SSC letter of November 21, 1975, requesting delivery of materials pertaining to the authorization and purpose of electronic surveillances conducted by the FBI.

The SSC letter of November 21 referenced a summary chart prepared by the FBI showing electronic surveillances conducted by the FBI since This chart was furnished to the SSC by letter of October 23, 1975.

This memorandum effects delivery of documents responsive to Items 5, 8, 12-16, 20, and 30 of the November 21 SSC letter. Those subjects are identified as follows:

> 5 - Harina Oswald Item

8 - Donald Freeman, Evon Carter, Huey P. Newton, and John William Washington

Item 12 - Young Lords Party, White Panther Party, and African Liberation Day Coordinating Committee

Item 13 - National Committee to Combat Fascism

Item 14 - Worker Student Alliance

HWP:mak

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Director Sec'y \_\_\_

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Re: UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Item 15 - Oliver Fein

Item 16 - Larry E. Canada, Jr.

Item 20 - Peoples Coalition for Peace and Justice

Item 30 - Arab League

With respect to Items 3 and 29, the targets of these surveillances were the Southern Christian Leadership Conference Office, Atlanta, Georgia, and Martin L. King, Jr. Material relating to this activity has been furnished previously.

Enclosures (33)

1 - The Attorney General



## OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

December 8, 1975

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director Legal Counsel Division

Federal Bureau of Investigation

( FROM:

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.

Special Counsel for Intelligence

Coordination

SUBJECT:

Senate Select Committee Request

N

Attached is a request from the Senate Select Committee dated November 26, and received in this Office on December 4. To the extent that this request has not been already answered, please prepare an appropriate response in order that the requested material, not already given the Committee, may be available for Committee use at the hearings scheduled for the Director and the Attorney General on December 9 and 10, respectively.

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cc: Paul Daly

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December 8, 1975

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director

Legal Counsel Division

Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.

Special Counsel for Intelligence

Coordination

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee Request

Attached is a request from the Senate Select Committee dated November 26, and received in this Office on December 4. To the extent that this request has not been already answered, please prepare an appropriate response in order that the requested material, not already given the Committee, may be available for Committee use at the hearings scheduled for the Director and the Attorney Ceneral on December 9 and 10, respectively.

Frank Church, Idaho, Chairman John G. Tower, Texas, Vice Chairman

PHILIP A. HART, MICH. WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN. WALTER D. HUDOLESTON, KY. ROBERT MORGAN, N.C. GARY, HART, COLO. HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN. BARRY GOLOWATER, ARIZ CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER,

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL CURTIS R. EMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

November 26, 1975

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq. Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination Office of the Deputy Attorney General U. S. Department of Justice Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mike:

In preparation for the forthcoming hearings on FBI domestic intelligence, including the hearing on informants and the hearings with Director Kelley and Attorney General Levi, the Select Committee requests the following information:

- 1. Examples of instances where the FBI has obtained information which was used effectively to prevent violence and where the information was obtained in the course of regular criminal investigative activity relating to subversion or extremism.
- 2. Examples of instances where the FBI has obtained information which was used effectively to prevent violence and where the information was obtained in the course of intelligence investigations which would not have been logically related to regular criminal investigations.
- 3. Examples of 1 and 2 above where informants provided the information or examples of 1 and 2 above where confidential sources provided the information.

This material may be provided in summary form, provided that access is subsequently given to the underlying materials according to our established procedures.

OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS

DEPUTY ATTORNEY CEMERAL
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

11 NOV 28 1975 最

O.R.O.M. D

OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE. AFFAIRS

Sincerely,

John T. Elliff, Director, Domestic Intelligence Task

DEC 4 1975

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NW 55101 DocId:32989554 Page 73

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FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN

" JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.

WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.

WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.

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CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

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# United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

November 26, 1975

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.
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Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
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- 3. Examples of 1 and 2 above where informants provided the information or examples of 1 and 2 above where confidential sources provided the information.

This material may be provided in summary form, provided that access is subsequently given to the underlying materials according to our established procedures.

Sincerely,

cc: Paul Daly

John T. Elliff, Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-1170

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall 1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar 1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy

The Attorney General

December 5, 1975

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. D. K. Pettus

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to a memorandum from the Senate Select Committee (SSC) dated May 14, 1975, and appendices thereto requesting certain documents and other information from the FBL

In response to that request, a letter on July 1, 1975, was directed to you attaching certain enclosures for your approval and subsequent passage to the Committee.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum and one enclosure which furnishes additional information concerning the Committee's request.

A copy of the memorandum with its enclosure is provided for your records.

Enclosures = 4

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REC 12

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.

Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination

1 - 62-116009 (Cointelpro)

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Page 75

1 - Mr. J. Mintz 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall 1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar 1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy 1 - Mr. D. K. Pettus

62-116395

December 5, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE "HUSTON PLAN," COINTELPRO, AND OTHER PRACTICES AND PROGRAMS

#### COINTELPRO

Reference is made to the memorandum from the Senate Select Committee (SSC) dated May 14, 1975, and the appendices thereto which contained requests for information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

In a memorandum dated July 1, 1975, the Eureau furnished a reply with pertinent enclosures to Item 19, Part II, Appendix C, of the May 14, 1975, request. The Committee had requested all memoranda or material disclosing approval or knowledge of the Cointelpros by any Government official outside the FBI, including but not limited to any Attorney General, member of Congress, or President. Item 4 of the memorandum dated July 1, 1975, to the Committee concerned hearings before the House Subcommittee on Appropriations. A further review of FBI records discloses that information regarding the FBI Cointelpros was prepared for "off-the-record" use by former Director Hoover in connection with his appearance before the House Subcommittee on Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1958. A copy of this material is attached.

Assoc. Dir.

Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.

Asst. Dir.:

Asst. Dir.:

Admin.
Comp. Syst.

Including all material prepared by former Director Hoover for

Ext. Affairs

Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.

Inspectional DKP: Ifj
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.

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Spac. Inv.

Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

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Page 2

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

Telephone Rm.

Director Sec'y

MAIL ROOM

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Director Hoover for

EXAMPLE AND ADMINISTRATION CONTAINED

Laboratory

Plan. & Eval.

HERVIN IS UNIT DECLOSURE

Telephone Rm.

Director Sec'y

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EICLOSURE

Telephone Rm.

Director Sec'y

MAIL ROOM

TELETYPE UNIT

EICLOSURE

United States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

Re: Documents Pertaining to the "Huston Plan," Cointelpro, and Other Practices and Programs

"off-the-record" presentation to the House Subcommittee on Appropriations, be declassified for public hearings. The attached material has also been declassified so it may be utilized for public hearings.

#### Enclosure

1 - The Attorney General

#### NOTE:

See letter to Attorney General dated 12/5/75, captioned "United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities," prepared by DKP:lfj.

The attached material, which indicates that information concerning FBI Cointelpro was first prepared for former Director Hoover's possible "off-the-record" testimony before the House Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations in 1957, was discovered during a review of Bureau documents by Analytical Research Unit personnel for another request from the SSC.

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535
Addressee: Senate Select Committee
LTR LHM Memo Report dated 12/5/75
Caption of Document: Re 5/14/75 let. Documents per- taining to the "Huston Plan," COINTELPRO, and other practices and programs. COINTELPRO.
Originating Office: FBI
Delivered by Date: 12/17/77
Received by: John J- Wilson.
Title: Reception of
Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI



TE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intollicance Community Chaff	PROM:	
TO: Intelligence Community Staff ATTN: Central Index	FROM:	
	FEI	
SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provid		ees
<ol> <li>HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term. If a documen for review but not transmitted, so note.)</li> </ol>	t was made available 2.	DATE PROVIDED
DOCUMENT BRIEFING INTERVIEW T	ESTIMONY OTHER	12/5/75
3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add spec	ific names if appropriate)	
x ssc		
HSC		
4. IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for docum	ents; give name or identific	cation number of briefer,
interviewee, testifier and subject)		
Memorandum and enclosures		
5. IN RESPONSE TO (list date and item number if in re wise state verbal request of (name), initiative, s		ther- 6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (ente
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7. KEY WORDS (enter the appropriate key words from th used underline for emphasis)	e list provided separately;	if key words not listed are
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8. SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this i	tem)	
Furnishing materials of FBI COI	MTELPROs prepared	"off-the1
record" for use by former Directhis appearance before the House	tor Hoover in conf	ection With
for Fiscal Year 1958. Material	de-classified so	they may be
utilized for public hearings.		•
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CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

#### INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY — enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.



UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# *1emorandum*

FROM

John Mint FBI

Jack Fuller

Special Assistant to the Attorney General

SUBJECT:

Joseph Kraft files

Senstudy 1975

DATE: December 5, 1975

In accordance with the agreement of May 2, 1975, with Joseph Kraft, the Attorney General has advised Lloyd Cutler, Mr. Kraft's attorney, that FBI personnel would enter the sealed portion of the Kraft files to prepare for transmittal to the Senate Select Committee the documents requested in the letter to Michael Shaheen dated November 7, 1975. Mr. Ron Green of the Cutler firm advised me on December 4, 1975 that there was no objection to doing this immediately and waving the 10-day waiting period described in the agreement with Mr. Kraft.

Accordingly, please prepare two copies of each of the documents requested by the Senate Select Committee -- one for review by Mr. Kraft and his attorneys and one for transmittal to the Committee. Deliver both copies to me and then return the original documents to the file and reseal it.

62-116395-1174

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

62-116395

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

FBI

Date:	12/4/75	j

ransmit the following in .

(Type in plaintext or code)

WKEN JOHN

Vig AIRTEL

(Priority)

TO:

DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)

FROM:

SAC, DALLAS (105-5731) (RUC)

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Re Bureau teletype to Dallas, 12/3/75.

Enclosed for the Bureau are three Xerox copies of interviews or contacts between SA JAMES P. HOSTY, JR. and JIMMY GEORGE ROBINSON. Enclosures are described below.

#### Enclosure No. 1

FD-302 dated 6/24/63, obtained from closing Dalías report of SA JAMES P. HOSTY, JR., dated 6/23/63. Copy of signed statement obtained from JIMMY GEORGE ROBINSON included in the FD-302 attached. File from which this information was obtained is as follows: Dallas file 44-1552, Bufile unknown, entitled, "THERAN M. WARD, Justice of the Peace, Garland, Texas; Detective BOBBY MOREHEAD; Officer J. W. CARLOCK; Officer DON MORGAN, Garland Police Department, Garland, Texas; JIMMY GEORGE ROBINSON - VICTIM, CR," OO: Dallas.

#### Enclosure No. 2

Letterhead Memorandum dated 8/18/64, submitted to Bureau via airtel dated 8/18/64. Copy of signed statement obtained from JIMMY GEORGE ROBINSON at time of contact on ,

2 - Bureau (Enc. 3) 1 - Dallas (20) (5) EEH: daf ()

7. DES 6 1975

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ATT. INFORMATION CONTAINED

Special Agent in Charge

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Per

105-5731

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#### Enclosure No. 3

Dallas letter to Baltimore dated 2/6/63, containing contents of a letter JIMMY GEORGE ROBINSON had received. The letter was furnished to SA JAMES P. HOSTY, JR., who prepared the communication. The file from which this information was obtained is as follows: Dallas file 100-0-6225, entitled, "Lt. Gen. P. A. DEL VALLE, INFORMATION CONCERNING (INTERNAL SECURITY)."

Review of all Dallas indices and files in which JIMMY GEORGE ROBINSON is referenced, reflect no further contacts between ROBINSON and SA JAMES P. HOSTY, JR.

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
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SAC. DALTIMORE

SAC, DALLAS (100-0)

LT. GEN. P. A. INFORMATION CONCERNING (INTERNAL SECURITY)

On 1/31/63 JIMMY GEORGE/ROBINSON, Route 1, Garland, Texas, made available the following letter which he received from a source he refused to disclose.

> mimeographed This/letter read as follows:

> > "Lt. Gen. P. A. del Valle 41 Cornhill Street Annapolis, Maryland

> > > 14 September, 1961

"When a free and sovereign people find their elected servants in government. and their appointed advisors, following a course of action contrary to their oath of office, destructive of the Constitution they have sworn to uphold, and leading relentlessly to the loss of their freedom and their sovereignty, they must perforce take the most effective action to restore sane, constitutional government, or perish as a free and sovereign people.

"A government that aids and abets the enemies of freedom at home and abroad; recklessly spends the substance of the nation in the purchase of votes and in the pursuit of a pro-communist policy; punishes patriots who dare defy the communist enemy they are trying to shield, while giving positions of power and pelf to those traitors who give aid and confort to this enemy; employs the power of the press and all other communications media to deceive the people as to their real aims and objectives; behaves as though this nation were already but a province of the illegally joined United Nations; is willing or unable to meet the constant flow of crises provided by an arrogant enemy, yielding piece by piece the entire world into their ruthless hands; shows every sign of having yielded their powers to an unseen, irresponsible and thoroughly rapacious government within the government; then even the bread and circuses no longer can hold the people in check. They must take matters into their own hands and force the traitors out of power and oblige their elected representatives to honor their oath of office.

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ENCLOSURE 1600-116375-1173X

"In such case there are several courses of action open to the people. Political organization to vote out the traitors and vote in the patriots is one. Pressure by personal appeals,, petitions, letters and telegrams is another. But the time comes when the enemy, feeling strong and secure enough, shamelessly ignores these efforts of the people, and makes ready to replace constitutional government with socialistic tyranny openly and quickly. Then there is yet another course of action left: The organization of a powerful, armed resistance force to defeat the aims of the usurpers and bring about a return of constitutional government.

"The formation of such a nation-wide force, under the second article of the Bill of Rights, and for the legitimate purpose of preventing a communistic takeover of their beloved country, with the total loss of their freedom, cannot fail to bring into being again that sovereignty which, under our form of government, is based upon the people. Government rules by the consent of the governed, and, when the governed refuse further to consent to being betrayed, then beware! Those in government who have been loyal need have no fear. But when the day comes that the people, in the exercise of their constitutional rights and sovereignty once more take up arms as they did in 1776, then must the traitors take flight. For the wrath of a free and mighty people, a God fearing people, against atheistic tyrants can be terrible and swift. I pray to God that courses one and two will Buffice, but if they do not, then I pray to God that this last instrumentality be given His grace to discharge our obligation to defend those sacred rights He, and He alone, gave unto us."

# "/s/ P. A. del Valle"

The above is being furnished for the information of the Baltimore Office. No further action being taken by the Dallas office.

JIMMY GEORGE ROBINSON is a self-admitted organizer for the NSRP.

#### Dallas, Texas August 18, 1964

RE: Detective H. M. HART;
Sergeant P. T. DEAN,
Dallas Police Department;
JIMMY GEORGE ROBINSON - VICTIM
CIVIL RIGHTS

On August 14, 1964, JIMMY GEORGE ROBINSON appeared at the Dallas Office of the FBI and furnished the following signed statement:

"Dallas, Texas Aug. 14, 1964

"I Jimmy George Robinson make the following free and voluntary statement to James P. Hosty, Jr. and Will Hayden Griffin who have identified themselves to me as Special Agents of the F.B.I.

"I was born June 24, 1938 at Bonham, Texas. I reside at 1221 West Garland Ave., Garland, Texas with my father. I am divorced from Velma Pauline Robinson.

"At approximately 2:00 pm on Aug. 14, 1964 I went to the Dallas School Administration Building at Ross and Washington Streets in Dallas, Texas where I had heard that Negro and white demonstrators were picketing the Dallas School Board. I had a Conferderate Flag and an unloaded rifle.

"I got out of the vehicle that I drove to the School Building and with the rifle on one shoulder and the Confederate Flag on the other shoulder, I walked about eight steps and a man in a suit who told me he was a Police Detective asked me to follow him. This man whose name I learned was H. M. Hart took me into the School Administration Building and questioned me.

"After about fifteen minutes Detective Hart and a Police Sergeant named P. T. Dean took me to the Dallas Police Department and charged me with Distrubing the Peace aggrivated.

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"I was at no time mistreated in any way either physically or verbally. I was released on a twenty five dollar Bond at 3:20 pm on 8/14/64. I am to appear in court on 8/26/64.

"I believe my Civil Rights were violated because I was arrested and I had violated no law by carrying a Confederate Flag or unloaded rifle. It was my intention totalk to the Dallas School Superintent W. T. White and ask him to resegregate the Dallas schools.

"I did the above on behalf of no organization, but only as an individual.

"I have read the above statement consisting of the page and two other pages and it is true to the best of my knowledge

"/s/ Jimmy George Robinson

"Witness: /s/ James P. Hosty, Jr. Special Agent, FBI Dallas "/s/ Will Hayden Griffin Special Agent FBI, Dallas Texas 8-14-64"

ROBINSON described Detective HART as a white male, six feet tall, 160 pounds, dark hair, and a circular scar on his cheek.

ROBINSON described Sergeant P. T. DEAN as a white male, 5' 10", 175 pounds, dark complexion.

RCBINSON described himself as a white male, six feet, 150 pounds, brown hair, blue - green eyes.

An article appeared in the Dallas Morning News, a daily Dallas newspaper, which reflected that JIMMY GEORGE ROBINSON was arrested at 1:25 p.m. on August 14, 1964, carrying a large Confederate flag and an unloaded Japanese rifle in front of the Dallas School Administration Building. ROBINSON appeared as pickets from the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) had completed their fifth day of demonstrations in front of the school headquarters. When ROBINSON appeared, these pickets were leaving and when they saw him, they started to return, until they saw ROBINSON had been taken off by police officers.

Detective H. M. HART

This article further stated that RCBINSON had previously marched in protest of civil rights pickets who were picketing a downtown Dallas cafeteria earlier this year.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ئىر سەر دىن ئىر سەر دىن Hallas, Jelas aug. 14, 1964 I Jaminy George Robinson make the following free and voluntary statement to James P. Hosty, Ir and Will Hayden Friffin who have identified themselves to me as Special agents of the N. B. J. Donham, Tefan June 24, 1938 at Bonham, Tefan Jusisle at 1221 West Garland For Starland Refan with my father I am divorced Long Velma Banline Lobinson. at approximately 2;00 pm on Cing. 14, 1964 I went to the Dullas School administration Building at Ross and Washington streets in Dallas, Ilkus and white present that negro-strators were pubeting the Dallas School Board. I had a Conferderate Hay and an unloaded rifle I got out of the vehicle that Juny Leonge Kabuisan

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Date	e6/25/63	
Date	re <u>6/25/63</u>	

JIMMY GEORGE ROBINSON, 200 Second Avenue, Garland, Texas, was interviewed and furnished the following signed statement:

> "Garland, Texas June 24, 1963

"I, Jimmy George Robinson, make the following voluntary statement to James P. Hosty, Jr., and Donald J. Cesare, who have identified themselves to me as Special Agents of the F.B.I. have been advised that this statement may used in a court of law. No force, threats, or promises were used to obtain this statement.

"I was born June 24, 1938, Bonham, Texas. I completed eighth grade in school.

"On June 20, 1963, I was arrested by the Garland, Texas, police for assaulting my wife, Pauline Robinson. I was arrested at 9:35 AM, and released at 2:00 PM. @ later learned from my half brother Donald Kaiser that at about 1:30 PM, two Garland police officers and one Garland detective, names unknown, accompanied my wife to our residence at 200 Second Avez, Garland, Texas.

"The Garland Police then searched my office and removed some of my literature I had concerning racial integration and the Jewish conspiracy. They also took my membership list for the National States Rights Party. I am the organizer for the National States Rights Party in the Dallas, Texas, area.

"My office is a separate building behind my house. National States Rights Party rents this office from me for one dollar a month. My wife had no right to let the police search this office as it was not under her control. My membership list was returned, but they kept my literature. They also took pictures of my office and some of the signs I had.

"I feel that my civil rights have been violated because the Garland Police searched the office of National States Rights Party, of which I am the head in the Dallas area, without my consent.

	HEREIN IS UNO DATE 1) 09 /30	MOR-11	mpin		,
On _	6/24/63 of Garland, Texas	9	File #DL	44-1552	·
	SAS DONALD J. CESARE, and				
bу	JAMES P. HOSTX JR	/jeg	Date dictated	6/24/63	

your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside versions for the second state of the second sec

"I have read the above statement consisting of this page and two other pages and it is true to the best of my knowledge.

### "/s/ JIMMY GEORGE ROBINSON

"Witness: JAMES P. HOSTY, JR., Special Agent, FBI, Dallas, Texas, 6/24/63

DONALD J. CESARE, Special Agent, FBI, Dallas, Tex., 6/24/63."

ROBINSON stated he considered THERAN M. WARD the one mainly responsible for the violation of his civil rights since he was the one who issued the warrant for his arrest. ROBINSON described WARD as follows:

Race: White Sex: Male

Age: Approximately 40 years

Height: 6'

Weight: 165 lbs. Hair: Dark.

ROBINSON described the detective as follows:

Race: White Sex: Male

Height: About 5'8" Weight: 160 lbs.

Hair: Dark

ROBINSON described the two police officers as follows:

No. 1

Race: White Sex: Male Height: 6'1"

Weight: 190 lbs.

Hair: Blond Eyes: Blue Complexion: Light

No. 2

Race: White Sex: Male

 Height:
 5'10"

 Weight:
 185 1bs.

Hair: Blond
Eyes: Blue
Complexion: Light

exton.

#### DL 44-1552

Eyes:

ROBINSON is described as follows, as obtained through observation and interview:

> Race: White Sex: Male

June 24, 1938, Bonham, Texas 5'10" Born:

Height: Weight: 175 lbs. Hair: Brown Light Blue Complexion:

Garland, Legas June 24, 1963 I Jimmy George Robinson make the following voluntary Statement to James R. Horty, J and Donald J. Cesare who have identified themselves to me no Spacial agents of the D. B. J. I have been advised that this statement may used in a court of Sur. In force, threats, or promises were used to obtain this statement. I was born June 24, 1938 Bonhum Defens I completed lighth grade in school. On Jame 20, 1963 I was asserted by the Gurland Defus Police for assaulting my wife, Gauline Robinson. I was arresteel at 9:35 am and released at 2:00 pm. I later Dearned from my half brother Donald Kaiser theat at about 1:30 pm two Garland Oshie officers and one Garland detective numes unbrown accompanied my wife to our residence at 200 Second are, Tarland Gegas. Jimmy & Kobinson

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Statement consisting of this force and two other pages and the is true to the last of my knowledge Witness; James Plasty, Joseph Specially Mbl, Della 9/24. Dinard Course, Special Cym, 1/5; Dulla 6/24.

December 4, 1975

TO: William O. Cregar, FBI

FROM: John Elliff, SSC STE

SUBJECT: Declassification of Materials

Attached is a set of materials which the Senate

Select Committee wishes to have declassified. I have

indicated our proposed excisions. Please let me know

as soon as possible whether additional excisions should

be made before declassification. I have removed all

references to foreign countries and third agencies.

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NO 5610EC 106140722989554 Page 101

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

February 14, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENER

Forcism. DOMENICAL LOBBYING ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES

INTERNAL SECURITY - DOMENICAN-REPUBLIC

Dominican lobbying activities in the United States we are proceeding with arrangements to institute technical surveillances on the following individuals at their residence addresses as given:

non-citizen target

Foreign-diplomatic official

Lawrence Myers

Director, Sugar Division, Commodity Stabilization Service, Department of Agriculture

Residence: 5530 Prospect Street

Chevy Chase; Maryland

Telephone: OLiver 2-6646

Tom Obie Murphy

Agricultural Economist, Sugar Division, Commodity Stabilization Service REC-58

Department of Agriculture

4307 Woodacre Court Residence:

McLean, Virginia

KE110gg 8-2747 Telephone:

William Merrit Case -

Administrative Officer, Sugar Division, Commodity Stabilization Service,

Department of Agriculture

APPROVED

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nauthorized Disclosure

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## MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

4545 Connecticut Avenue, N. W. Washington, D. C. EMerson 2-6244 Residence:

Telephone:

It is recommended that you authorize the technical coverage on the above individuals at their current addresses or at any addresses to which they may move in the future.

Respectfully.

Edison Homes John Eddar Hoover
Director

REUL. DEC 2 19/5 FBI



# UNITED SETRET UNITED SETRET FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No. 105-25204

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

February 16, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Re: DOMENICATE LOBBYING ACTIVITIES

IN THE UNITED STATES—INTERNAL SECURITY - DOMENICAN R

In connection with our investigation regarding Dominican lobbying activities in the United Etates, recent developments indicate technical coverage of Michael B. Deane, a Dominican registered agent, might provide valuable data. Information has just been received that Deane has recently signed a contract to lebby in behalf of the Dominicans and the Dominicans intend to use and manipulate Deane as a contact man with high officials of the United States Government. We are making arrangements to institute technical coverage on Deane at the following business and residence addresses:

Business: Michael B. Deane Associates 1700 K Street, Northwest Washington, D. C. Telephone: District 7-1441

reregnone: District 7-2441

Residence: 3315 Fessenden Street, Northwest Washington, D. C.

Washington, D. C. Telephone: Elerson 2-7953

It is recommended that you authorize technical coverage on Michael B. Deane at his current business and residence addresses or at any addresses to which he may move in the future.

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Respectfully,

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John Edgar Hoover

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· FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION





In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

February 16, 1961

MEMORANDULI FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

IDOMINICAM LOBBYING ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES INTERNAL SECURITY - DOMENTICAN REPUBLIC

In connection with our investigation regarding Dominican lobbying activities in the United States, we are making arrangements to institute a technical surveillance on

the following individual at the residence address as given:

Mrs. Christine S. Gallagher Secretary to Representative Harold D. Cooley of North Carolina and Clerk, United States House Committee on Agriculture Residence: 2500 Q Street. Northwest Washington, D. C. Telephone: North 7-8442

It is recommended that you authorize technical surveillance on the above individual at her current address or at any address to which she may move in the future.

Respectfully,

hn Edgar Hoover Director

17 MAR & 1961

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Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

June 26, 1962.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: SUGAR LOBBYING ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING

Reference is made to your request that we keep abreast of activities with regard to the pending sugar legislation. particularly with regard to Haitt and some of the Central American countries.

We have conducted surveys and have found that with full security assured we can establish technical coverage of the following:

Foreign-establishment:

5 non-citizen targets

Foreign establishment.

Eoreign establishment:

Foreign establishment. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Foreign commercial establishment.

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#### MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

The residence of Mrs. Christine S. Gallagher, Carlyn Apartments, 2500 0 Street, Northwest, Washington, D. C., telephone number North 7-8442;

The firm of Surrey, Karasik, Gould and Efron, Woodward Building, 735 15th Street, Northwest, Washington, D. C., telephone numbers REpublic 7-0366 through REpublic 7-0370, and REpublic 7-0323 through REpublic 7-0327.

In connection with the firm of Surrey, Karasik, Gould and Efron, our inquiries reveal that Walter Sterling Surrey is the representative of the South Puerto Rico Sugar Company and of sugar interests in the French West Project He has recently been for frequent touch with officials of the Dominican Republic in connection with the sugar legislation. He was formerly a registered agent of the Dominican Republic and during the Dominican sugar lobbying activities in 1961, he was active in behalf of Dominican sugar interests.

With regard to Mrs. Christine S. Gallagher, she is Clerk of the House Agriculture Committee and secretary to Congressman Harold D. Cooley. Coverage of her residence in connection with our inquiries last year into Dominican lobbying activities produced pertinent information.

Accordingly, it is requested that you authorize our installation of technical surveillances on the establishments, individual and firm listed above, or any locations to which they may move in the future. Un June 25, 1962, Department of State clearance was secured with regard to such coverage of the official establishments.

Respectfully,

John Edgar Hoover Director

DATE /-9-62

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

June 29, 1961

JUNC

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: UNKNOWN SUBJECT

Leak of Classified Information
Appearing in July 3, 1961, "Newsweek"
Magazine Article Captioned

← "Pentagon Plan" ESPIONAGE - X

Lloyd Norman is a correspondent at the Pentagon for "Newsweek" magazine. He resides at 5420 Thirty-first Street, Washington, D. C.

In connection with the investigation you requested in captioned matter, a technical surveillance at Norman's residence address was instituted on June 27, 1961. For the completion of your records and those of this Bureau it is suggested that this technical surveillance be authorized at Norman's current address or any address to which he may move.

Respectfully,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

Approved: Muly

Date: 6/30/61

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NW 55101 Doctd: 32989554-Page 108





# NITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

#### FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

JunE

July 31, 1962

#### MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Re: ARTICLE BY HANSON IT. BALDETN
IN "THE NEXT YORK TIMES,"
JULY 26, 1962
ESPIONAGE - X

(10)2

In connection with your request for an investigation of the unauthorized disclosure of classified information in the captioned article, surveys have indicated that technical surveillances on Hanson W. Baldwin, 39 Forton Place, Chappaqua, Westchester County, New York, and on Laura M. Kaltz, 2700 Wisconsin Avenue, Northwest, Kashington, D. C., can be made with security. Baldwin is a correspondent for "The New York Times" and Waltz is a secretary in the Eashington, D. C., Bureau of this newspaper. She reportedly makes appointments for Baldwin in Washington, D. C. Accordingly, your authority is hereby requested for technical surveillances on their current addresses as well as on other addresses to which they may move in the future.

Respectfully,

Cohn Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED

DATE

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Subject to Criminal Sanctions

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# UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

April 19, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

FRANK CAPELL Re: ESPIONAGE - X

The subject is the editor of the newsletter, "The Herald of Freedom." He is an extremist in his attitude toward communism and uses his newsletter to expose people and organizations he considers communist and subversive. JFK Act 6 (1)(B)

Capell is known to be in possession of information classified up to and including "Secret." some of which originated another with this Bureau and some with He has refused to furnish his source for this information. has published some of this classified information in copies of his newsletter and he has advised this Bureau that he plans to publish a book which will contain additional classified information. It appears that the subject's source is a United States Government employee having access to the classified information and his action in furnishing Capell this classified information plus Capell's publishing it, constitutes a danger to the internal security of the United States. In at least one instance there is a danger of a most sensitive source of this Bureau being compromised. If the identity of Capell's source can be learned, we may eliminate

In view of the above, it is requested that you authorize technical coverage on the subject's residence located at School House Road, Somerset County., Zarephath, New Jersey, and on his place of business at the same address or on any addresses to which he may move in the future or to which his place of business may be moved in the future.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Unauthorized Disclosure

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

ohn Edgar Hoover

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DATE

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NRUNA AT PLAIN

11:40 AM URGENT DECEMBER 10, 1975 JKB

TO: DIRECTOR (134-6502)

FROM: ATLANTA (C)

LESLEY E. ROGERS, FORMER EXTREMIST INFORMANT; AT FILE

134-190. SENSTUDY 75; AT FILE 62-2854.

RE ATLANTA AIRTEL TO BUREAU, MARCH 5, 1973,

AND BUREAU AIRTEL TO ATLANTA, MARCH 14, 1973.

FOR THE INFORMATION OF THE BUREAU, REFERENCED

COMMUNICATIONS ARE CONCERNED WITH PREVIOUS COMPLAINTS FROM

SUBJECT, ROGERS, CONCERNING HIS ALLEGED MISTREATMENT BY

THE FOI. ATLANTA FILES REVEAL THAT ROGERS TESTIFIED IN A

STATE OF GEORGIA TRIAL CONCERNING THE BOMBING OF A JEWISH

TEMPLE WHICH OCCURRED IN 1959. SUBSEQUENT TO THE TRIAL,

HOWEVER, ROGERS HAS COMPLAINED ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS THAT

THE FUL "ABANDONED" HIM. DUE TO TRIAL PUBLICITY, ROGERS HAS

CUNTENDED THAT HE AND HIS FAMILY HAVE SUFFERED EMBARRASSMENT

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Asst. Dir.:
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Director Sec'y

Plan. & Eval. Spec. Inv. \_\_\_

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56 JAN 26 1976 NW 55101 DocId: 32989554 Page 111 PAGE TWO AT 134-190; AT 62-2854

AND HARASSMENT PRIMARILY DUE TO HIS INABILITY TO OBTAIN

GAINFUL EMPLOYMENT.

ON THE EVENING OF DECEMBER 9, 1975, ROGERS
TELEPHONICALLY CONTACTED THE ATLANTA DIVISION AND ADVISED
HE WAS FILING A BRIEF BEFORE THE "CHURCH COMMITTEE" (U.S.
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE). ROGERS STATED THAT WHILE HE HOLDS
THE FBI IN HIGH ESTEEM, HE STILL FEELS HE WAS TREATED
IMPROPERLY BY THE BUREAU FOLLOWING HIS TESTIMONY AT THE TRIAL.
ROGERS STATED THAT HE RECENTLY TELEPHONICALLY CONTACTED TE
CHURCH COMMITTEE REGARDING HIS COMPLAINT AND THE COMMITTEE
REQUESTED THAT HE SUBMIT A BRIEF PROVIDING DETAILS OF HIS
ALLEGATIONS AGAINST THE FBI.

THE ABOVE IS BEING FURNISHED FOR THE INFORMATION OF THE BUREAU.

END

DLS FEIHQ ACK AND CLR

SECRET

Mr. N. P. Callahan

J. B. Adams

MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. SECURITY MATTER - COMMUNIST 1 - Mr N. P. Callahan

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams

1 - Mr. T. J. Jenkins

1 - Mr. D. W. Moore

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannell 12/5/75

1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

Classified & 3042 portrous

Doctassity on DADB 3/3/89

At their request, I met today (12/5/75) with "Dallas Times Herald" Staff Writers Hugh Aynesworth and Bob Dudney. During a discussion on another matter, the subject of Martin Luther King, Jr., came up and they referred to two general allegations about King: (1) Allegedly, King received money from a man in New Jersey who was connected with the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), who had received money from the Soviet Union or had other Soviet connections. (2) King may have been in the posture of submitting speeches he intended to give to high CPUSA officers in New York City prior to his making the speeches. The writers asked me for any official comment I could make on this matter.

On the basis of the sparse information stated by the writers, it appears likely that they were referring to the following two situations which were documented in our files: (1) King's principal advisor was the secret CPUSA member, Stanley David Levison, who lived and had business connections in the New York-New Jersey area and who was deeply involved in the funds operations of the CPUSA, including funds from the Soviet Union. (2) King received advice and help from Levison and other communists in respect to various aspects of King's work, including King's speeches.

100-106670

CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED BY
DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC)
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SPORET

Memorandum to Mr. N. P. Callahan Re: Martin Luther King, Jr. 100-106670

Particularly concerning speeches, Levison was frequently assisting and may have actually written some of King's speeches, and he also counseled King on acceptance or nonacceptance of speech commitments. There have also been indications that other CPUSA officials may have assisted King on speech matters in a like manner.

It should be noted that most all information in these two areas originated from our SOLO informants and we have closely guarded such information (These matters were part of our recent (11/5/75) very special briefing of Senator Church of the Senate Select Committee (5SC) and selected of his Staff Members. We should also recognize that over the years there have been many press accounts relating to King's communist connections and some of the information discussed above might well have been publicized, but perhaps in modified form. For example, Levison's name has been publicized as being the person who was an important advisor to King.

During my testimony before the SSC on 11/19/75, I responded to a question from Senator Church, when discussing the King investigation, as follows: "One, the basis for our investigation of Martin Luther King, which was to determine communist influence on him, my hands are tied in discussing that somewhat on the basis that there is certain information which today, from an ongoing operation is sensitive and which, of course, we have made known to you and certain Staff Members. I would like to say on the basis of our review we feel that we initially had a basis for investigating Martin Luther King."

SECKET

CONTINUED - OVER

SECTO

Memorandum to Mr. N. P. Callahan Re: Martin Luther King, Jr. 100-106670

#### OBSERVATIONS:

We may anticipate that the current inquiry from the "Dallas Times Herald" writers is but one of many similar inquiries we will be receiving concerning our King investigation. Because of the very sensitive aspects involved, it is believed that we should make no public comments concerning the King investigation but merely refer any inquiries to the already public record of my testimony. In other words, we need only to refer inquiries to that testimony which in substance says, "We had a firm basis for the investigation of King. However, for reasons of national security and ongoing investigations, we are unable to provide any specifics."

#### RECOMMENDATION:

Accordingly, it is recommended that in respect to the current inquiry and future similar ones, we respond as suggested immediately above under observations. Upon approval, this memorandum should be returned to me and I will appropriately advise the "Dallas Times Herald" writers.

SEVERET

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz (1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis) 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall 1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar 1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy

The Attorney General

December 3, 1975

18. Mark and 1862

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. D. Rvan

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to the memorandum of Mr. Mark L. Wolf, Special Assistant to the Attorney General, to Inspector John B. Hotis of this Bureau, dated November 26, 1975, captioned "Information and documents pertaining to the Attorney General's testimony before the Senate Select Committee concerning the FBI," requesting. the Department be furnished FBI information and documents relating to the discontinued Counterintelligence Programs (Cointelpros).

Set forth below is information responding to this request, it being noted the paragraphs have been numbered to correspond with the numbers in referenced memorandum:

1. Enclosed are copies of a memorandum dated February 27, 1975, directed to all Special Agents in Charge, and a teletype dated July 29, 1975, directed to all Special Agents in Charge and Legal Attaches, which constitute instructions from Director Kelley to the FBI implementing the Attorney General's February 26, 1975, and July 23, 1975, directions relating to the reporting of improper actions. Information set forth in these communications was also furnished to FBI Headquarters personnel. REC 12 62 -116395-

2(a). Enclosed are seven extracts of "off the record testimony prepared for the use of Director Hoover before the House Subcommittee on Appropriations for Fiscal Years 1958, 1959, 1960, Dep. AD Adm. \_ 1961, 1963, 1966, and 1967. It is noted these extracts have been Dep. AD inv. — excised to delete information which could compromise sensitive FBI sources and operations, and therefore they no longer are considered classified. DEC 121973

ENCLOSURE MENCLOSURE ATTACHED

1 - 62 - 116009 (Cointelpro)

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#### The Attorney General

- 2(b) and (c). Enclosed is one copy of pertinent pages of the testimony of Director Hoover before the House Subcommittee on Appropriations on February 10, 1966. Page 52 of this document contains the information referred to in 2(b) and pages 41-60 relate to FBI internal security operations referred to in 2(c).
- 3. Enclosed is a copy of Director Kelley's press release dated December 7, 1973, regarding the FBI's Cointelpro effort directed against the New Left. This release is correctly dated December 7, 1973, and not December 17, 1973, as indicated in referenced memorandum.
- 4. Enclosed is a copy of a memorandum dated July 16, 1975, captioned as above, which sets forth the identities of FBI Headquarters personnel involved in the preparing and reviewing of the initiating and terminating documents of this Bureau's Cointelpros. The following FBI personnel, with current positions noted, who prepared or reviewed the initiating documents for Cointelpros are currently on the rolls of this Bureau: Andrew J. Decker, Jr., Assistant Director, Computer Systems Division; W. Raymond Wannall, Assistant Director, Intelligence Division; Herbert D. Clough, Jr., Special Agent in Charge, Norfolk Division; Theodore P. Rosack, Special Agent in Charge, Denver Division; Thomas J. Deakin, Supervisor, Intelligence Division; David Ryan, Supervisor, Intelligence Division.
- 5. Enclosed is a copy of WFBI Headquarters memorandum dated April 27, 1971, and an airtel from Director, FBI, to all field offices dated April 28, 1971, terminating the Cointelpros.

### The Attorney General

- 6. Enclosed is a copy of a memorandum, captioned as above, dated September 24, 1975, which outlines two Cointelpro-type actions against domestic groups approved in February, 1972. These are the only actions which have been determined to date to have been effected after the April, 1971, terminating date, and it is noted these authorizations did not appear in any Cointelpro-type file of this Bureau.
- 7. Enclosed is a copy of the "Statement of Elmer B. Staats, Comptroller General of the United States before the Subcommittee on Civil Rights and Constitutional Rights House Committee on the Judiciary on Domestic Intelligence Operations of the Federal Bureau of Investigation."

Enclosures - 16

John Hotis

DATE: Nov. 26, 1975

Mark L. Wolf, Special Assistant

to the Attorney General

Information and documents pertaining to the Attorney SUBJECT:

General's testimony before the Senate Select Committee

concerning the FBI.

To assist in preparing for the Attorney General's testimony before the Senate Select Committee, we would appreciate . it if the FBI would furnish to us as soon as possible the following information and documents:

- The instructions from Director Kelley to the FBI implementing the Attorney General's February 26, 1975 and July 23. 1975 directions that practices or requests to the FBI which are or may appear to be improper be reported to him.
- 2. Documents indicating that Congress was informed of. some Cointellpro activities, including, to the extent they are not duplicative:
  - those mentioned in the Saxbe November 18, 1974 Statement indicating the House Subcommittee on Appropriations knew of some activities as early as 1958 (Nov. 18, 1974 Tr. 9-10; SSC Tr. 1649, 1711);
  - the February 10, 1966 Hoover testimony regarding penetration of the KKK referred to by DAG Silberman on November 20, 1974 (Testimony 47);
  - (c) the 1967 printed Appropriations Subcommittee testimony discussing the FBI's internal security operations mentioned by Jim Adams on November 19, 1975 (SSC Tr. 1754);
- Director Kelley's press release of December 17, 1973 regarding Cointellpro-New Left;
- 4. The names of the key FBI personnel in the Cointellpro (those who supervised, recommended or approved Cointellpro activities) and their present positions, if file 5- 0 any, in the Bureau;

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS DNCLASSIFIED DATE 11 114 2000 RV 02

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- 5. The April 1971 notice terminating Cointellpro;
- 6. Any requests for counterintelligence activity against domestic groups made since April 1971 and their disposition;
- 7. The GAO study concerning the value of FBI surveillance of domestic groups (SSC Tr. 1605).

# Memorandum

To : To the Files

DATE: Nov. 25, 1975

FROM : Mark L. Wolf NLW

SUBJECT:

Attorney General's February 27, 1975 Testimony regarding FBI Operations

In his February 27, 1975 testimony before the Edwards Committee regarding FBI information-gathering practices, the Attorney General gave certain assurances, most of which seem to be addressed by the FBI guidelines. These include assurances that:

- 1. An examination would be made of the practice of collecting information on individuals, including Congressmen (Tr. p. 6).
- 2. An attempt would be made to devise a procedure to screen unsolicited materials to be retained by the FBI, or to periodically review them to determine whether they should be retained (Tr. 16-17).
- 3. Director Kelley and his associates do not maintain files on specific individuals in their offices which might be considered "dossiers" (Tr. 24). Confirmation that this remains true today might be obtained.
- 4. Measures would be taken to minimize the opportunity for the FBI to be misused (Tr. 24).
- 5. Director Kelley was directed to report to the Attorney General practices or requests to the FBI which are or may appear to be improper (Ir. 27-28). This direction was repeated in July, 1975. The FBI documents informing the Bureau of this policy should be obtained. Instances in which matters concerning actual or apparent impropriety have been reported to the Attorney General should be listed.
- 6. Consideration would be given to an Executive Order to limit the authority in the White House to make requests directly to the FBI to a few highly placed White House officials (Tr. 28).
- 7. Consideration would be given to the scope and effect of the Executive Order which requires the FBI to report to the

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heads of executive departments and the Civil Service Commission unverified allegations relevant to the character of government employees (Tr. 29).

- 8. If the guidelines were complete, the Attorney General would be delighted to announce them (Tr. 35).
- 9. Consideration would be given to whether a member \_\_\_\_ of Congress should be permitted to review FBI files concerning him not compiled in an investigation authorized by statute and, if he wishes, order the destruction of those files (Tr. 86).

cc. Attorney General
Doug Marvin
Jack Fuller
Michael Shaheen

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
JULY 1973 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum.

To : The Files

DATE: Nov. 25, 1975

FROM : Mark L. Wolf NLW

SUBJECT: Attorney General's SSC testimony regarding the FBI -- Meeting with SSC Staff

On November 24, 1975 Doug Marvin, Jack Fuller, Mike Shaheen, Ray Hornblower and I met with John Elliff and Mark Gittenstein of the SSC staff to discuss the Attorney General's testimony regarding the FBI now scheduled for December 10, 1975.

The SSC has already had public testimony concerning the FBI from its staff and Jim Adams. It plans to have two days of relevant hearings next week, one on the FBI informant program and another on Department of Justice supervision of the FBI. On the latter subject, the SSC hopes to have as witnesses former FBI officials Sullivan and DeLoach and former Attorneys General Rogers, Katzenbach and Clark.

During the week of December 1, 1975, the SSC proposes to hear public testimony from Williams Ruckelshaus, Henry Petersen, and Joseph Califano on FBI domestic intelligence activities, Clarence Kelley on the impact certain proposals would have on the FBI, and the Attorney General on controlling the FBI. The SSC may also request executive session testimony from the Attorney General on the FBI's activities relating to foreign intelligence.

Gittenstein and Elliff described 5 areas which the SSC would like to discuss publicly with the Attorney General. These are:

- 1. The legal authority for FBI domestic intelligence activities, including whether President Roosevelt had the authority to initiate the program and, if so, whether his authorization was properly construed by the FBI.
- 2. The breadth of the FBI's domestic intelligence operations, which included women's liberation groups and Martin Luther King, and whether the FBI manual or the proposed guidelines would permit activities directed against such groups today or in the future. ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED.

NW 55101 Docid: 32989554 Page 123 DATE W 4 0000 BY SPA ALM M

- 3. Whether "preventive action" is ever appropriate and, if so, how it should be controlled.
- 4. Whether the Department, the President or Congress has given the FBI adequate guidance on what individuals or groups constitute internal security threats with which it should be concerned and whether there is regular review by anyone to reevaluate the current danger presented by an individual or group previously designated as an internal security threat.
- 5. Whether guidance given to the FBI is being followed and how this can be assured. Related quastions include whether the FBI can properly investigate itself, whether the Department of Justice should have an Inspector General, and whether GAO should be involved in regularly auditing FBI activities.

In the course of discussion, Elliff and Gittenstein alluded to several other questions which might be raised. These include:

- 1. Should internal security activities be permitted at all, or can what Elliff called the "Stone Standard" be readopted?
- 2. The question raised by the Martin Luther King case of what degree of suspected or actual connection with a foreign government should be required to trigger surveillance or investigation of a domestic group? How should "infiltration" be defined?
- 3. How does a domestic intelligence investigation differ from a criminal investigation and can the differences be justified?
- 4. Should there be a statute explicitly authorizing and limiting domestic intelligence activities? If so, what should be authorized?
- 5. What happens to information compiled in the course of unlawful surveillances or activities initiated on the basis of reasonable beliefs which prove to be unfounded?

Elliff asked whether the proposed FBI guidelines could be distributed to members of the SSC and used as a basis for discussion at the hearings. We indicated we would consider this request.

cc. Attorney General
Doug Marvin
Jack Fuller

Michael Shaheen Ray Hornblower John Hotis

# Memorandum

To : The Files

DATE: Nov. 25, 1975

FROM : Mark L. WolfNLW

SUBJECT:

Questions suggested by FBI testimony of SSC Staff and Jim Adams.

Mike Shaheen's office is preparing a synopsis of the testimony regarding the FBI presented on November 18 and 19, 1975 by the SSC staff and Jim Adams. In my view, the staff testimony suggests several areas of interest to the SSC, listed below, which may be discussed with the Attorney General when he testifies.

- 1. The SSC questions the value of investigation and surveillance of domestic groups believed to be extremist or subversive. According to its staff, the GAO attempted to evaluate these activities (Tr. 1605). They found that of 675 cases reviewed, only 16 had been referred for prosecution; resulting in 4 convictions. In addition, in only 12 of these cases did the GAO find "that the FBI gained any advance knowledge of planned activities, and 51 percent of those cases revealed no association with objectionable organizations or no illegal objectionable activities" (Tr. 1605). Thus, the staff concludes that surveillance of domestic groups has had little prosecutorial or intelligence value and questions whether such activities should ever be conducted in view of the costs and risk of abuse they involve.
- 2. The SSC staff believes that important FBI documents were included in the "personal files" of J. Edgar Hoover which were destroyed after his death (Tr. 1608). They believe that Hoover had reviewed the personal files lettered A to C and transferred some official documents from these to the OC files. However, files lettered D through Z were not reviewed in this manner and the staff presumes that some official documents were lost when these files were destroyed. The SSC believes that the FBI unintentionally gave the Attorney General an incomplete report on this matter which suggested that no FBI documents were destroyed. This report was later transmitted to the SSC.
- 3. Senator Tower believes that attention should be paid to the use of informants, a form of information-gathering which does not require judicial or Department of Justice approval (Tr. 1617).

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- 4. Interest has been expressed in whether the counter-espionage and internal security functions of the Bureau should be separated within the FBI or handled by different organizations to reduce the risk that techniques appropriate to counter-espionage will be improperly employed against domestic groups (Tr. 1636).
- 5. The 1971 FBI document ending Cointellpro stated that "In exceptional instances where it is considered counterintelligence action is warranted, recommendation should be submitted to the Bureau under the individual case caption" (Tr. 1651). Thus, it may be asked whether there have been any such requests since 1971 and, if so, whether any were aprpoved.
- 6. The SSC staff believes that the history of the "Security Index" is an excellent example of the problems of oversight and relationships between the FBI, the Department and Congress (Tr. 1663).
- 7. In 1973 the FBI asked the Department to seek statutory authorization for domestic intelligence activities and such authority has not to date been sought (Tr. 1675).
- 8. The FBI procedure of reporting by an "INLET" letter items with an unusual twist or concerning prominent individuals was discontinued because there were better means of communicating "dirt" to headquarters for dissemination to the White House (Tr. 1707). This raises the question of whether agents are still expected to furnish such information to headquarters and, if not, when it was stopped. If it has not been stopped, what type of information is now forwarded and what is done with it?

cc. Attorney General
Doug Marvin
Jack Fuller
Ralph Hornblower
John Hotis
Michael Shaheen

Sommittee on Internal Security recently heard and days of testimony on four bins aimed at "crushing the orban guerrillas," incoming one "that would make it a crime to belong to or aid organizations advocating terrorism, and would prohibit the publication of periodicals that advocate violence against police and the overthrow of the Government."

The President's Commission on Carapus Unrest in detailing "the law enforcement response" noted that "it is an undoubted fact that on some carapuses there are men and women who plot, all too often successfully, to burn and bomb, and sometimes to main and kill. The police must attempt to determine whether or not such a plot is in progress, and, if it is, they must attempt to thwart it."

Finally, Allan C. Brownfeld, a faculty member at the University of Maryland, writing in "Christian Economics," February 11, 1970, on "The New Left and the Politics of Confrontation" noted that "in many instances, those extremists who have fomented disorder have been in violation of state and Federal statutes." But, Mr. Brownfeld noted. "What is often missing is the will to prosecute and to bring such individuals before the bar of justice." Mr. Brownfeld's article was subcaptioned "A Society Which Will Not Defend Itself Against Anachists Cannot Long Survive."

#### IV. APPROPRIATIONS TESTIMONY

On February 10, 1966, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover testified regarding the Ku Klux Klan, saying that "the Bureau continues its program of penetrating the Klan at all levels and, I may say, has been quite successful in doing so. The Bureau's role in penetrating the Klan has received public attention due to the solution of the brutal murders of Viola Luizzo in Alabama, Lieutenant Colonel Lemuel A. Penn in Georgia and the three civil rights workers in Mississippi. We have achieved a number of over tangible accomplishments in this field, most of which are not publicly known but are most significant." Discussion off the record followed.

#### V. PUBLIC SUPPORT OF THE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM

Following acknowledgement that the FBI had a counterintelligence program, syndicated columnist Victor Riesel whote on June 15, 1973, "no apologies are due from those in the highest authority for secretly developing a domestic counter-revolutionary intelligence stratagem in early 1970." Mr. Riesel detailed the record of "dead students," university libraries in flames," and "insensate hundering of cops," and concluded "it would have been wrong not to nave after the tree the sheer off-flae-wall terrorism of the 1959-70 bomb secons. And it would be wrong today. No one need apologize for counterrevolationary acticu."

"Our reaction is that we are exceedingly glad be ordered it." wrote the "St. Louis Globe-Democrat" in a December 11, 1973, chierral on the counteringence program. This newspaper noted that "the Federal Bureau of Investigation under the late J. Edgar Hoover conducted a three-year campaign of counterintelligence to expose, disrupt, and neutralize the New Left movement . . ." and that "many of these New Left groups were doing everything they could to undermine the Government and some of them reserted to bembings, street riots, and other gangster tactics. Others waged war on police across the Nation and on our system of justice. Still others disrupted the Nation's campuses. The Nation can be thankful it has a courageous and strong leader of the FBI to deal with the serious threats posed by New Left groups during this period."

On June 18, 1974. Eugene 11. Methyin, Senior Editor, "The Reader's Digest," testified before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs regarding terrorism and noted, "... the FBI's counterintelligence program against the extremist core of the New Left was a model of sophisticated, theefive counter-terrorist law enforcement action first developed and applied with devastating effect available for Kukhux Klan in the mid-1960s. In that context the strategy won great publicity and praise; yet now we have the Atterney General condemning it. In the current climate of justifiable revulsion over Watergate, we are in danger of crippling law enforcement intelligence in a hysteria of reverse McCarthyism in which we close our eyes to evidence and some compelling necessities of domestic and international recentify."

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that our whole domestic intelligence operations were secret. The COINTELPRO operation was. I mean, I think we all agree that: this was, to be effective, they felt it should be secret. But back in our -- this is printed appropriation testimony which went to the members of the Committee. It was mailed out to newspapers, friends, anyone that was interested in it, back in 1967 talking about Internal Security's operations, the New Left movement, Young Socialist Alliance, Chicago trial, nationwide demonstrations, student agitation, anti-war activities, the Committee of Returned Volunteers, Communist Party, U.S.A., Progressive Party, Socialist Party, extremist organizations, Black Panther Party. All of these items and statements about extremists, white extremists and hate type groups, the Republic of New Africa, Minutemen, our coverage of subversive organizations -- there are several groups, organizations and movements which I discussed showed the wide coverage we must maintain to follow on their activities and changing tactics, and in spite of the proliferation of these organizations, our informant coverage at all levels has been of great value and assistance, enabling us to keep abreast of our investigative responsibilities.

This is the same way through all of our public appropriation testimony. We have told the world we are investigating black hate groups, New Left groups.

So, I merely mention this to try to put in the frame of reference of these men feeling, they know we are investigating

Mr. Giten cin. There is a separate ivision within the FBI called the Inspection Division of the FBI. It conducts annual inspections of all of the other divisions of the FBI as well as all of the field offices. It also responds to allegations of abuse within the FBI, but the inspections are all conducted internally by FBI agents and rarely, if ever, are there inspections or investigations by other personnel within the Department of Justice of what the FBI does, although in recent months there have hear investigations of allegations of illegality by the Criminal Division of the Justice Department concerning mail opening and other allegations. Senator Schweiker. I see my time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Schweiker. Senator Tower, do you have any questions?

Senator Huddleston, did you have some further questions?

Senator Huddleston. Just one quick question or two on the matter of oversight.

Was the Congress or members of Congress or appropriate
Committees informed by the Bureau of the COINTEL Program?

Mr. Schwarz. The evidence on that as provided to us by the Bureau is that the House Appropriations Committee -- I've got to be very careful how I put this -- there are documents which indicate remarks prepared for off the record comments to the House Appropriations Committee. Whether in fact those

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in the war sentiment in this country. However, either there was no perceived sentiment or the FBI did not get the message in terms of Black Nationalists because the intensity of that effort is shown to continue right through the last showing of the chart in the 1971 time frame.

Now one of the questions that emerges when we examine all of this activity is certainly the obvious one of who told them they could do it. And with respect to who told them they could do it, the answer is largely one of the Bureau decided that it was a good idea.

Mowever, this should not be taken to mean that there was no communication and no attempt to advise important officials of at least some of the Bureau's efforts. It is pretty clear from our look at this area that with respect to efforts against the Communist Party and efforts against the Klan, Mr. Hoover sent letters to Attorneys General, including Rogers, Kennedy, Katzenbach, Clark and Mitchell, which he believed constitute a notification of the existence of these efforts against the Communist Party and the so-called White Hate organizations.

in 1958 regarding the Communist Party COINTELPRO efforts and that the House Appropriations Subcommittee was given information on both the Communist Party and White Hate COINTELPRO.

What we have been unable to find are disclosures relating

NW 55101 DocId:32989554 Page 130

1 - M. D. W. Moore
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. J. Miller

The Attorney General

January 16, 1976

REC-100

irector, FBI 62 - 116375-1171X

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Enclosed is the original of a memorandum concerning an interview of former FBI Assistant Director Thomas E. Bishop by SSC Staff Members. Also enclosed is a copy of the memorandum for forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

1 - 67- (Personnel File Former Assistant Director Thomas E. Bishop)

SJM:1hb (10)

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S. Mark Son

Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_
Training \_\_\_\_
Legal Coun. \_\_\_
Telephone Rm.

Inspection

Intell. \_\_\_\_\_ Laboratory \_\_\_\_ Plan. & Eval. \_\_

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_
Dep. AD Adm. \_
Dep. AD Inv. \_
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. \_\_\_\_
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_
Files & Com.

MAIL ROOM TELE

GPO: 1975 O - 569-920

D. W. Moore J. A. Mintz 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall 1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar 1 - Mr. S. J. Miller

62-116395

Jaruary 16, 1976

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FORMER FBI ASSISTANT DIRECTOR THOMAS E. BISHOP BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS

The following concerns an interview on December 2, 1975, of former FBI Assistant Director Thomas E. Bishop by SSC Staff Members.

The FBI released Mr. Bishop from any existing employment agreements for the purpose of the interview.

Mr. Bishop's account of the interview follows:

"During my appearance before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities on December 2, 1975, I was sworn in by Senator Richard Schweiker, who stayed only for a very brief time. I was interviewed from 9:00 a.m., to about 5:00 p.m., with Gordon Rhea, Assistant to the Chief Counsel; Frederick Baron, Assistant to the Chief Counsel; and Barbara Banoff, Counsel, present during the entire questioning; and with Joseph DiGenova, Counsel, participating during the morning session; and John Elliff, -Head of the Domestic Task Force, participating in the Dep. AD Adm. \_ Dep. AD Inv. \_afternoon.

Asst. Dir.: Admin. \_

Training \_\_\_SJM:1hb (9)

"They first wanted me to give them a detailed Comp. Syst. -Ext. Affairs account of just what duties the Crime Records Division (CRD) Gen. Inv. \_\_performed. This included every function performed by the front office, as well as each and every thing that each Inspection \_\_\_ (Personnel File Former Assistant Director

Laboratory ---SEE NOTE PAGE 7

Thomas E. Bishop) Plan. & Eval. \_ Spec. Inv. \_\_\_

ORIGINAL, AND ONE COPY TO AG

TELETYPE UNIT \_\_\_ 6 2 Telephone Rm. \_ / MAIL ROOM

NW 55101 DocId:32989554 Page 132

EXALOSURE:

STHATE SCLECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF FOLMER FBI ASSISTANT DIRECTOR THOMAS E. BISHOP DY SSC STAFF THINBERS

of the sections did. They were particularly interested in the handling of press matters-whether we played any favorites among papers in giving out news stories, exactly what type of information we gave out to the press; et cetera. I told then we played no favorites, but that I naturally knew personally what papers and reporters were favorably disposed toward the Bureau and which were prejudiced against us and that this was in my mind in dealing with the press. I stressed to them that we always strictly followed the Littorney General's guidelines on what could and could not be given to the news media on criminal cases and that only information of a strictly public source nature was ever given to any newsman in other types of cases. I carefully explained to them what public source information is and differentiated it from information developed by interviews, or information from informants or sources, or information gotten through other investigative techniques. I also stressed to them that we never withheld from any newspaper. reporter, radio or television network any information which they had a right to know about, no matter how antagonistic or anti-FBI the paper, television or radio network or the reporter might be.

'The following are some of the topics which they went into in depth:

# "MASS HEDIA PROCRAM

They showed me dozens of memoranda prepared by the Domestic Intelligence Division (DID), under this program, all of which recommended that the CRD give information to selected newspapers or publications, which information reflected unfavorably on certain individuals or organizations. Many of these memoranda SCHAIR SALUCT CYMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

IN: INTERVIEW OF FORMER FBI ASSISTANT DIRECTOR THOMAS E. BISKOP BY SSC STAFF NUMBERS

related to Martin Luther King, Jr., other racial leaders and racial organizations. It was obvious that they didn't think much of this program and thought of it as harasseent. They wanted me to justify each of the memoranda. I pointed out to them that they did not originate in the Cit and that I, therefore, did not think that it was up to me to justify them. I pointed out that the role of the CAD was to merely serve as a conduit to get the information prepared by the DID to the reporter, that the information to be passed by us to a reporter was compiled by the DID and that the approval of the action proposed by the memoranda was in most cases completed before the memoranda even came to us. I also pointed out that, in each of the memoranda they showed me, the information to be passed to the press was of a strictly public source nature and that mone of the information could be considered confidential.

# "CATHIELPINA

They showed me a lot of memoranda prepared by the DID under this program which also recommended giving certain information to certain reporters about selected individuals and groups. I told them that, as far as the CND was concerned, these were handled the same as those under the lass liedia Program and that all of my replies and explanations under that caption (above) also applied to this program.

# "IN NOT CONTACT LIST

They wanted to know all about the handling of this. I told them and also explained there was nothing sinister about it and that it was merely to keep our Agents from wasting their time contacting people during investigations who had clearly indicated that they did not wish to be SEMANE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLICENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RG: INTERVIEW OF FORTER FBI ASSISTANT DIRECTOR TRAMAS E. BISHOP BY SSC STAFF REABLAS

contacted and also to keep our Agents from being insulted or vilified repeatedly by people who made a practice of doing this whenever contacted by an Agent. They seemed satisfied that the list was in no way a 'Blacklist.'

#### "SPECIAL CORRESPONDENTS LIST

I had to explain this in detail--its purpose, how a person got included on the list, what publications, et cetera, were sent to people on the list. It appeared my explanations satisfied them.

#### "MITTE HOUSE MAKE CHECKS

This was gone into pretty thoroughly. In answer to a question, I told them that we generally knew from the list of names on which checks were being asked what was the reason for the name check request (because the list would generally indicate a date on which a function was being held at the White House to which the people on the list had been invited); I told them, however, that we would still handle the name check even though we did not know why it was requested. They tried to make something out of that but gave up after I pointed out how ridiculous it would be if the FBI refused to give the President a summary of data in our files on a person unless he first told us why he wanted it.

# "COMBRESSIONAL FILLS

I had to give them a detailed explanation of thiswhat information we collected from the field offices on newly elected congressman and senators, what we did with the information, what we used it for, et cetera. They seemed to back off from it when I explained that the chief SEMAND SELECT COMMITTED ON INTULLICENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF FORTUR FBI ASSISTANT DIRECTOR THOMAS II. BISHOP BY SSC STAFF HARBERS

purpose of the Congressional Files was to assist me in handling liaison with the Senate and House-that I wanted to know which Congressmen and Senators were crooks, lushes, libertines, et cetera, because I certainly wouldn't trust enyone like that. I said I could give them some specific, horrible examples, but they didn't want me to put the names on the record.

#### intolica ibraiosia.

He was the attorney for Dr. Spock during the latter's trial. During the trial a memorandum was written setting out all the public source data known on him, and it was recommended that it be given to a friendly newsman. They wanted to know why this was proposed, whether the information was, in fact, given to a newsman at that time and if we made a practice of giving out derogatory data on attorneys for defendants in Dureau cases. I told them we must have been asked for public source data by a newsman and that's why the memorandum was written. I also showed them notations written on the memorandum which specifically prohibited the data being given out while the trial was in progress or even until after all appeals in the Spock case were concluded.

### "THE THE THE TELETYPE

While I was being interviewed, the Administrative Assistant to Senator Philip Mart called the staff and asked that I be requested to make a detailed statement on the record concerning the above matter. I was delighted to do so. I put on the record a detailed explanation of

SEMAND SULECT COMMITTEE ON INICIALIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RU: INTERVIEW OF FORTUR FBI ASSISTANT DIRECTOR THOMAS H. BISHOP BY SSC STAFF RELIBERS

the handling of this matter and clearly placed the responsibility for it where it belonged. The reason Senator Hart wanted to get my side of it on the record is because Gray, during his confirmation hearing, had tried to slip and dodge questions about this and Senator Hart thought he may have come close to perjury.

### "'IAS ARGELES (LA) THES' AND JACK MELSON

I was questioned in great detail concerning the Eureau's relations with the above paper and with Jack Welson, one of its Washington-based reporters who for some time had been carrying on a vendetta against Mr. Hoover and who on several occasions had claimed he was out to 'get' lir. Moover. In 1971 or 1972, the General Manager of the LA Times came to see Mr. Moover and, before he went in, the CAD prepared a detailed memorandum on our relations with the "A Times" and on what we had in our files on Melson. The Staff was in possession of this memorandum and questioned me intensively about it. I explained why it was prepared, that it was for internal use only (I emphasized this because the Staff seemed to think we had planned to give it to someone outside the Eureau), and explained the whole background of the situation. In doing so, I must admit I took advantage of the situation to get on the record several times my description of Welson as a 'drunken S.O.B. "

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF FORMER FBI ASSISTANT DIRECTOR THOMAS E. BISHOP BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS

#### NOTE:

Mr. Bishop's report of the interview was set out in his personal letter of 12/4/75 to Supervisor Seymor Phillips of the Senstudy 75 Project. Mr. Bishop asked that the letter be carefully edited. This was done to omit those portions which were irrelevant to the interview or were personal comments to Mr. Phillips. In those instances where it was unclear as to whether Mr. Bishop was reporting what he said during the interview or was merely commenting parenthetically, the portions were also omitted. Legal Counsel memorandum to Mr. J. B. Adams 11/28/75 captioned "Senstudy 75" prepared by PVD:dkg recommended releasing Bishop from any existing employment agreements for purposes of the SSC interview.

In his letter to Mr. Phillips, Mr. Bishop, under that portion, captioned "The Ehrlichman Teletype," also wrote, ". . . this was the matter in which Pat Gray tried to shaft me by telling the newspapers that the handling of this matter had been done by me without authority, without the approval of my superiors. The truth of the matter was that I had objected to Mark Felt that the Bureau shouldn't even handle this, I had been specifically ordered to initiate action on it by Felt and that Felt, David Kinley and Pat Gray had all approved the handling of it. Of course, when 'Life' Magazine printed a critical story about it. then Gray started to get scared and tried to dump the blame I challenged him on it quite vigorously and, in fact, this was the thing that finally made me realize that I should retire from the Bureau because Gray was playing politics and using the Bureau to do so."

NOME: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

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Times and Jack Nelson.

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ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS VELLOW

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

#### INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY — enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

FROM

1 - Mr. Wannall

1 - Mr. Mintz

1 - Mr. Cregar

1 - Mr. Hotis

DATE: 11-28-75

Dep. AD Inv.

Files & Com.

Inspection

Training

1 - Mr. Daly

May

On 11-25-75 Gordon Rhea, staff member of the Director Soc'y Senate Select Committee, requested that former Assistant Director of the Crime Records Division, Thomas E. Bishop, be released from existing employment agreements for the purpose of a staff interview by that Committee relating to the operations of the Crime Records Division and the "mass media program." Rhea stated he had obtained the current address for Mr. Bishop and was going to contact him immediately. Rhea indicated that the current intentions of the Committee are to have Cartha DeLoach testify on the 3rd of December publicly before that Committee and they desired to interview Bishop prior to that appearance.

On 11-26-75 former Assistant Director Bishop telephonically advised SA Paul V. Daly of this Division that he had been contacted by Mr. Rhea of the Senate Select Committee and requested to appear at that Committee's offices for interview. Bishop stated he told Rhea he agreed to appear on the evening of 12-1-75 and the day of 12-2-75. Rhea indicated to Bishop that it might be necessary for him to appear in public session before captioned Committee with former Assistant to the Director Cartha DeLoach. He stated, however, that no decision had been made at that time regarding such an appearance. Mr. Bishop was advised of the fact that the Bureau had pledged cooperation to this Committee and the request would be made for the Assistant Director to be released from existing employment agreements for purposes of the interview by that Committee. Additionally, he was informed that his appearance was, of course, a voluntary one and that if he felt there was a need for legal representation, he should so advise the Bureau. He was generally advised of the procedures of the Senate Select Committee relating to interviews and was asked to contact the Legal Counsel Division upon his arrival in Washington, D. C., so, that additional matters may be discussed with him at that

1 - Personnel File - Former Assistant Director Thomas E. Bishop

PVD:dkg (8)

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NW 55161-108 DocId: 32989554 Page 141

Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams Memo Re: SENSTUDY 75

#### RECOMMENDATION:

That former Assistant Director Bishop be released from any existing employment agreements for purposes of interview by the Senate Select Committee.

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

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ENCLOSURE

San Diego, Cal. December 4, 1975

Mr. Seymour Phillips FBI Washington, DC

Dear Seymour:

In accordance with your request, I am going to try to set down -- very briefly -- some of the items dealt with during my appearance before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Avtivities on December 2, 1975. I am a very poor typist and can't possibly remember all the matters discussed with me, so you will have to bear with me.

First of all, I was sworn in by Sen. Schweiker, who only stayed for a very brief time. I was interviewed from 9AM to a bout 5 PM, with Gordon Rhea, Assistant to the Chief Counsel, Frederick Baron, Assistant to the Chief Counsel, and Barbara Banoff, Counsel, present during the entire questioning, and with Joseph digenous, Counsel, participating during the morning session, and John Eliff, Head of the Domestic Task Force, participating in the afternoon.

Let me say at the outset that it was a pretty grueling experience, not because I vcouldn't handle the questions they threw at me, but because of the sheer length of the session and because I had absolutely no prior knowledge of what memos, documents, etc they were to throw at me. I do think that the Bureau does a disservice to former employees who have been out of the Bureau for some time and who have to appear before the Commityee, by not giving them some idea of the areas of questioning that will be faced with and some clues as to what old memos, etc thay will be called upon to explain.

Now, getting back to my questioning --- they first wanted me to give them a detailed account of just what duties the Crime Records Division performed. This included every function performed by the Front Office, as well as each and every thing that each of the Sctions and did. They were particularly interested in the handling of press matters -- whether we played any favorites among papers in giving out news stories, exactly what type of information we gave out to the press, etc. Naturally , I told them we played no favorites but that I naturally knew personally what papers and reportes were favorably disposed toward the Bureau and which were prejudiced against us and that this was in my mind in dealing with the press. I stressed to them that we always strictly followed the ATgorney General's Guidelines on what could and could not be given to the news media on criminal cases and that only information of a strictly public source nature was ever given to any newsman in other types of cases. I carefully explained to them what public source data is and diffdrentiated it from information developed by interviews, or info from

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techniques. I also stressed to them that we never withheld from any newspaper, reporter, radio or TV network any info which they had a right to know about no matter how antagonistic or anti-FBI the paper, TV or radio ntework ar the reported might be.

Now getting to some of the topics which they went into in depth.

### MASS MEDIA PROGRAM

The showed me dozens of memos prepared by the Dom. Intell. Div, under this program, all of which recommended that the Crime Records Div. give info to the selected newspapers or publications which info reflected unfavorably on certain individuals or organizations. Many of these memos related to M.L. King, other racial leaders , and racial organizations. It was obvious that they didn't think much of this program and thought of it as harrassment. Theu wanted me to justify each of the memos. I pointed out to them that they did not originate in the Crime Records Div. and that I therefore did not think that it was up to me to justify them. I pointed out the the role of the Crame Records Div was to merely serve as a conduit to get the inforation prepared by the Dom Intell Div to the reporter, that the infomation to be passed by us to a reporter was compiled by the Dom Intell Div and that the approval of the action proposed by the memos was in most sases completed before the memo even came to us. I also pointed out that, in each of the memos thacy showed me, the information to be passed to the press was of a strictly public source nature, and that none of the information could be considered confidential

### CONINTELPRO

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# DO NOT CONTACT LIST

They wanted to know all about the handling of this. I told them, and also explained there was nothing sinister about it and that it was merely to keep our agents from wasting their time contacting people during investigations who had clearly indicated that they did not wish to be contacted, and also to keep our agents from heing insulted or vilified repeatedly by people f who made a practice of doing this whenever contacted by an Agent. They seemed satisfied that the DNA list was in no was a "Blacklist"

#### SPECIAL CORRESPONDENTS LIST

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I had to explain this in detail -- its purpose, how a person got included on the list, haw what publications, etc, were sent to people on the list, etc. It appeared my explanations satisfied them.

#### WHITE HOUSE NAME CHECKS

This was gone into pretty thoroughly. In answer to a question, I told them that we generally knew from the list of names on which checks were being asked what was the reason for the name check request (because the list would generally indicate a date on which a function was being held at the White House to which the people on the list had been invited; I told them, however, that we would still handle the name check even though we did not know why it was requested. They tried to make something out of that but gave up after I pointed out how ridiculous it would be if the FBIrefused to give the President a summary of data in a our files on a person unless he first told us why he wanted it.

#### CONGRESSIONAL FILES

I had to give them a detailed explation of this -- what info we collected from the field offices on newly elected Congressmen and Senators, what we did with the info, what we used it for, etc. I frankly thought that they would go into this in even more detail than they did. They seemed to back off from it when I explained that the chief purpose of the Congressional Files was to assist me in handling liaison with the Senate and House-- that I wanted to know which Congressmen and Senators were crooks, lushes, libertines, etc because I certainly wouldn't trust anyone like that. I said I could give them some specific, horrible examples, but they didn't want me to put the names on the record.

### LEONARD BOUBIN

He was the attorned for Dr, Spock during the latter's trial. He has a long history of CP associations. During the trial a memo was written setting out all the public source data known on him and it was recommended that it be given to a friendly newsman. They wank ted to know why this was proposed, whether the info was in fact given to a newsman at that time, and if we made a practice of giving out derogatory data on attorneys for defendants in Bureau cases. I told them we must have been asked for public source data by a newsman and that's why the memo was written, I also showed them notations written on the mamo which specifically prohibited tha data beibg given out while the trial was in progres or even until after all appeals in the Spock case were concluded.

#### THE ERLICHMAN TELETYPE

While I was being interviewed, the Administrative Assistant to Sen. Phillip Hart, called the staff and asked that I be requested to make a detailed statement on the record concerning the above matter. I was delighted to dom so because many, this was the matter in which Pat Gray tried to shaft me by telling the newspapers that the handling of this matter had been done by me without authority, without the approval of my superiors. The truth of the metter wask that I had objected to Mark Felt that the Bureau shouldn't even handle this, I had been specifically ordered to initiate action on it by Felt, and that Felt, David Ki Kinley and Pat Gray had all approved the handling of it. Of course, when Life Magazine printed a critical story about it, then Gray started to get scared and tried to dump the blame on me. I challenged him on it quite vigorously and, in fact, this was the thing that finally made me realize that I should retibe from it youtherd the Bureau because Gray was playing politics and using the Bureau to do so. (Anyway, I put on the record a deatiled explanation of the handling of this matter and clearly placed the responsibility for it where it belonged. The reason Sem Hart wanted to get my side of it on the record is because Gray, during his confirmation hearing, had tried to slip and dodge questions about this and Sen Haft thought he may have come close to perjury.

## BOS ANGELES TIMES AND JACK NELSON

I was questioned in great detail concerning the Bureau's relations with the above paper and with Jack Nelson, one of it's Washington based reporters who for some time had been carrying on a vendette against. Mr. Hoover and who, on several occasions had claimed he was out to E "get" Mr. Hoover. In 1971 or 1972 the General Manager of the LA Times came to see Mr. Hoovers and. before he went in , the Crime Records Division prepared a detailed memo on our relations with the TIMES and on what we had in our files on Nelson. The staff was in possession of this memo and questioned me intensively about it. I explained why it was prepared, that it was for internal use only ( I emphasized this because the staff seemed to think we had planned to give it to someone outside the Bureau), and explained the whole background of the Situation. In doing so, I must admit, I took advantage of the situation to get on the record several times my description of Nelson as a "drunken S.O.B."

Well, Seymour, that's about as much as I can recall. R Besides, my wife is waiting for me to play golg with her. As I said, It was a long session. I did not, however, on any occasion ever admit that anything that was done by me, Mr. Hoover or the Bureau was wrong or improper, even with 20/20 hindsight. I only wish that some of the Bureau people who has testified would have expressed themselves the same way.

Sinserely Om Bishon

NW 55101 DocId:32989554

# Memorandum

Mr. W. R. Wannall Wrong

SUBJECT:

FROM:

5010-106

TESTIMONY BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BEFORE THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Dep. AD Adm. \_ Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_ Asst. Dir.: Admin. Comp. Syst. Ext. Affairs . Files & Com. Gen. Inv. \_ Ident. Inspection . Intell. Laboratory . Legal Coun. Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_

Telephone Rm. \_\_ Director Sec'y

Spec. Inv.

Training\_

Reference is made to memorandum in above caption from Legal Counsel to Mr. J. B. Adams dated 11/24/75.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

DATE:

11/28/75

(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)

Referenced memorandum under Item (1) requested Intelligence Division to prepare a synopsis of major topics concerning the Bureau which have been investigated by the Senate and House Select Committees.

Under Item (4), Intelligence Division (as well as General and Special Investigative Divisions) was requested to list major investigative techniques employed by the Bureau specifying in each case whether we seek Departmental approval.

There are attached to this memorandum inserts suitable for inclusion in an LHM which are responsive to the above requests.

It is noted that Recommendation (6) in referenced memorandum requested any other materials which might be useful in the preparation of the Attorney General's briefing book. The Intelligence Division has no additional information to submit in this category. REC 12 62 - 1/6375 DEC 12 1975

Enclosures

EWL: 1hb h (5)

CONTINUED - OVER

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HCK let it is Enclosures
HEREINIE HINCLASSIFIED
DATE 117 DOOD BY PROMINED
MOR-16
100. Util

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Testimony by the Attorney General
Before the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence Activities

## RECOMMENDATION:

That the attached material be approved and forwarded to the Office of Congressional Affairs, as requested in referenced memorandum for inclusion in the material being assembled for the Attorney General.

wowland

#### (4) Major Investigative Techniques: Intelligence Division

Set forth below is a list of the major techniques employed in the conduct of investigations administered by the Intelligence Division.

# I. Techniques utilized pursuant to the prior specific authorization of the Department:

All non-consensual electronic surveillance, including telephone, microphone, and body recorders. It should be noted that the Attorney General has delegated authority to approve use of body recorders to the Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Divison.

# II. Techniques utilized without the prior specific authorization of the Department:

- (a) Interviews.
- (b) Established source contacts, including conduct of logical record checks and review of material generally available for public inspection.
- (c) Informant coverage.
- (d) Physical and, where appropriate, photographic surveillance.
- (e) Mail covers, on a highly selective basis and with the concurrence of Postal authorities.

In addition to the major techniques employed in investigations supervised by the Intelligence Division, others of a more sensitive nature are used on a restricted basis in response to specialized investigative requirements. For information concerning techniques of this character, reference is made to memorandum from Director, FBI to The Attorney General captioned "Attorney General's Request Regarding Sensitive Investigative Techniques," dated September 15, 1975, classified "Top Secret."

62.116395-1171

1 - M. J.B. Adams 2 - Mr. J.A. Mintz (1 - Mr. J.B. Hotis) 1 - Mr. W.R. Wannall 1 - Mr. J.G. Deegan (Route thru for review) The Attorney General 1 - Mr. R.L. Shackelford 1 - Mr. W.O. Cregar 1 - Mr. E.P. Grigalus Director, FBI November 25, 1975 SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC) Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is the original of a memorandum requested by SSC in their letter dated November 7, 1975, concerning the operation of informants in the internal security field. A copy of this memorandum is being furnished for your records. Enclosures (2) 62-116395 1 - The Deputy Attorney General Michael E. Shaheen, Jr. Attention: Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination REC 12 62-116375 EPG: dew few (12)T-11A 5 DEC 12 1975 Asst. Dir.: Comp. Syst. Ext. Affairs \_ Files & Com. Gen. inv. -Inspection Laboratory \_ Plan. & Eval. \_ M+GPO: 1975 O - 569-920

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams 2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

1 - Mr. J.G. Deegan ( Route thru November 25, 1975 for review)

62-116395

U. S. SENATE SELECT COLLUTTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT

1 - Mr.Shackelford 1 - Mr. Cregar

1 - Mr. Grigalus TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION CONCERNING RE: THIS BUREAU'S OPERATION OF INFORMANTS IN THE INTERNAL SECURITY FIELD

Reference is made to SSC letter dated November 7. 1975, requesting a memorandum on this Bureau's operation of informants in the internal security field.

An informant, according to the dictionary, is "one who gives information." In light of this definition, it is clear that very few persons, if any, have not at one To give information is an

Information of the FBI are persons who furnish necessary and vital information—information which is used as a means of attaining justice. Informants clear the innocent as well as convict the guilty. They serve of their own free will. None are forced. Informants are as old as the human race. Their use is international. innocent as well as convict the guilty. They serve of their studded with many and varied examples of the uses of informants. No government or organized society has been without them.

Informants provide one of the best and most complete forms of coverage to the law enforcement officer. Sometimes they are the only means of penetrating subversive or extremist organizations. Informants are valuable because they obtain information more directly and thus save time and money; they are useful in checking on the accuracy of information TW/RC/ Dep. AD inv. \_ from other informants and have been used to help develop other informants; they give a better understanding of the motives, objectives and intentions of subjects which allows law enforcement to plan its investigative operations; they Files & Com. - prevent or minimize damage to property and injury to law enforcement officers and innocent persons; they further the Inspection \_\_\_ development of independent evidence to corroborate informants' Intell. — testimony or alleviate the need for informants' testimony and they become witnesses when necessary.

62.116375 EPG:dew (11) ON ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO

GPO 954-546

TELETYPE UNIT MAIL ROOM Director Sec'y MAIL ROOM TELETY MW 55101 DocId:32989554 Page 152

SEE NOTE PAGE 6

3. <u>eg</u> •

> Assoc. Dir. \_ Dep. AD Adm. \_ Asst. Dir.:

Admin. \_ Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_ Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_

Laboratory \_\_\_\_ Plan. & Eval. \_

Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_ Training \_\_\_ Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_

Telephone Rm. \_\_\_

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

The development of informants is one of the most difficult, unique and specialized assignments. Despite the obstacles encountered in informant development, Bureau Agents have met and are continuing to meet with steady and remarkable successes. They regularly demonstrate vision, daring and commendable resourcefulness in this work. The Bureau today we believe has the best informant coverage in its history.

When information is received or developed that a person has background qualifications indicative of informant potential. In an area where coverage is needed, a case is opened. Office and Headquarters indices are reviewed and other logical discreet checks are made, including canvass of logical sources, to preliminarily establish the individual's background, reliability, stability and integrity. preliminary checks are favorable, the individual would be interviewed to establish a personal assessment by a Special Agent as to the person's qualifications, potential. and willingness to assist this Bureau. If the interview is positive, additional background investigation is conducted to establish the person's reliability, stability, and integrity. Upon satisfactory completion of this investigation, the individual begins a development period with the handling Agent and after establishing a proven record of reliability. stability and productiveness, becomes a Keadquarters approved informant.

The Bureau's informants, particularly in the internal security field, have many restrictions imposed upon their relationship with the Bureau. For example, they are impressed with the confidential nature of their relationship with the FBI, that their actions are strictly voluntary and that they are not employees. If they are connected in any way with a labor union, they are informed that the Bureau is not interested in an employee-employer relationship or if connected with an institution of learning, they are specifically advised that the Eureau is not interested in the legitimate activities of educational institutions. In particular, all informants are instructed to avoid knowledge of defense plans and strategy or discussion thereof with attorneys, subjects or other individuals in any prosecution arising from intelligence or criminal investigations. In the event an informant is unable to avoid obtaining such information, this information

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

is not to be reported to the FBI. A signed statement, if possible, is obtained from each informant so that the informant is aware of the Bureau's position in these matters. (A copy of the signed statement appears herein as Attachment number one.)

From the time Special Agents enter New Agent's Class they are indoctrinated and trained in the legal aspects of the Bureau's work as well as the scope and limits of their authority. The Manual of Rules and Regulations specifically addresses the conduct of Special Agents in their investigative duties. (See Manual of Rules and Regulations Attachment number two.) Training continues in their offices of assignment, each office having a Legal Officer available for training, consultation and guidance. Frequent, extensive In-Service retraining programs further bolster the Special Agents' knowledge and utilization of the law in the conduct of their official duties. Specifically, informant development and handling are extensively discussed in the FBI's training programs and there is no question as to Special Agents being aware that informants cannot be directed to perform a function that the Special Agent may not legally perform. Special Agents are particularly reminded of the need to be alert to plants, potential agent provocateurs to be used against law enforcement in a variety of ways, so as to avoid unfounded allegations of impropriety which may jeopardize investigations or prosecutions as well as result in highly publicized contrived incidents reflecting adversely on law enforcement.

Many of our informants furnish needed and valuable information on a gratuitous basis. Many are also paid for their services. Payments to informants are one of the most highly supervised areas within Bureau operations. When a payment is made to an informant, the handling Agent must make a realistic determination as to the value of theservices performed by the informant. Established Bureau procedure requires that payments made to informants, upon recommendation of handling Agent and approval of appropriate supervisory personnel, originate from the office Field Support Account and are drawn from this account by check made out to the handling Agent for the amount authorized. The handling

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SEC)

Agent cashes the check at a local bank and then pays the informant the authorized amount in cash for which a receipt is received from the informant and maintained in FBI Although there is no overall memorandum of instruction or document dealing with cost effectiveness as it relates to informants, this factor is considered by the Special Agent handling the informant, his supervisor, and the Special Agent in Charge. Payments to informants for services are made commensurate with the value of information furnished and for actual expenses incurred in connection with obtaining information for the FBI. Recommendations concerning payments to informants on a regular basis receive careful consideration at Headquarters level. After analysis and comparison with payments currently being made to other informants operated under similar circumstances and providing similar-type information, authority is extended at Headquarters to pay informants for services and expenses within prescribed limits. When payments are authorized by Headquarters, it is the personal responsibility of each Special Agent in Charge to definitely assure that full value is being received. His review is on an individual basis wherein he evaluates the information received and the amount being recommended by the handling Agent for payment for this specific information. Additionally, instructions provide that each Special Agent in Charge is to insure that all pending informant files are reviewed personally by appropriate supervisory personnel on a regular periodic basis not to exceed a period of 60 days. This review includes, but is not limited to, assurance that full value has been received for all payments made to informants. Also the entire informant program is subject to annual review by our Inspection Staff which physically examines informant files to assure that they are being handled properly and that payments are being made commensurate with the value of information received,

In addition to the above controls and restrictions, information furnished from informants is constantly sifted, analyzed, recorded and disseminated. The information is verified where possible through other sources and individual investigation. A system of checks is constantly involved to prevent an informant from producing erroneous information by accident or design.

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Concerning warrants, a warrant requirement for the use of informants appears impractical and may be unconstitutional. It is impractical because probable cause usually is not available when the informant technique is initiated and the submission of an affidavit in application for a warrant would increase the hazard of exposure of the informant's identity. Such a limitation might be unconstitutional because it would limit the first Amendment rights of the informant to communicate with the Government. Existing legal restrictions require guided informants to recognize the same legal limitations as would be applicable, in the same circumstances, to those directing the informants. An informant can legally do no more than an Agent is permitted to do.

The Bureau in the domestic intelligence area has under investigation organizations, most of which have numerous districts, regions, offices, sections, chapters and clubs. These organizations and their subdivisions total over 1100, which receive investigative attention to some extent. These investigations are afforded coverage by less than 1100 internal security informants. It must be recognized, however, that there are other individuals who are in various stages of development in this field. Concerning payments, one-half of one percent (.5%) of the Bureau's budget (fiscal 1975) was utilized to pay all types of security informants including those in the foreign counterintelligence field.

As noted, the Bureau's utilization of informants involves a high degree of care and supervision. It is a specific Bureau policy that an informant may only be tergeted against individuals or organizations of investigative interest to the FBI. It must be recognized, however, informants furnish a wealth of related information which comes to their attention during the course of their assigned duties. While operating against assigned targets, the associations necessary to maintain credibility may lead to information concerning proposed or actual bombings, arsons, violent demonstrations, assassination plots, a variety of criminal activities and even location of fugitives. They also serve as listening posts in high crime and violenceprone areas and have contributed information directly responsible for the arrests of 176 persons during fiscal year 1975. Of this number, 61 individuals were arrested by FBI Agents and 47 FBI fugitives were located and

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

apprehended. Additionally the FBI located 442 persons and other federal agencies located 21 individuals. Local and state law enforcement authorities located 94 persons. During the same time frame, internal security informants provided information which led directly to the recovery of property valued at approximately one-half million dollars. It must be further recognized that a warrant requirement for use of informants would virtually eliminate access of law enforcement to this collateral information resulting in many crimes going unsolved or not prevented.

The FBI believes the elements of close supervision, restraint, latitude and judgment are essential in an informant program and it is further believed that the proper balance of these elements is being utilized by the FBI successfully in the operation of informants in the security field.

Enclosures - 2

1 - The Attorney General

#### NOTE:

SSC, by letter dated 11/7/75, invited the Bureau to submit a memorandum on our intelligence informant program that could be inserted in the record of the testimony of Bureau representatives at the proposed hearing. The hearing on informants is tentatively scheduled for 12/2/75. Pursuant to SSC request in the above referenced letter and as a result of a conference with SSC Staff Member, Bob Kelley, the above was prepared. In essence, SSC requested a description of our informant program in the internal security field excluding assets and criminal informants. The request concerned the handling, procedures, control, criteria and payments to internal security informants.

### ATTACHMENT NO. 3

I, have voluntarily
agreed to cooperate with the Federal Bureau of Investigation in
a matter affecting the security of the United States. I consider
it a patriotic duty to so cooperate and agree to maintain this
relationship in strict confidence. I understand that I am not
a Federal employee and will not represent myself as such. I
further agree not to make any disclosure or exploit in any way
information which I may obtain or any activity in which I may
engage on behalf of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, both
while I am actively associated with the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and thereafter, unless authorized to do so by
the Bureau. Also, I have been instructed and understand that,
consistent with the necessity to maintain the confidentiality
of my relationship with the FBI, I should avoid knowledge of
defense plans or strategy, or discussion thereof, with attorneys, subjects, or other individuals in any prosecution
arising from intelligence or criminal investigations. In the
event that I am unable to avoid such discussion or obtaining
such information, I will not report it to the FBI.
such information, I will not report it to the I bi.
(Signed)
Witnessed:

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE!! 1/200 BY DO PUM

ENCLOSURE 62-116325-1170

#### SECTION 1. CONDUCT AND ACTIVITIES OF EMPLOYEES

ATTACHMENT NO.

Illegal Activities Illegal activities on the part of any employee, in addition to being unlawful, reflect on the integrity of the FBI and betray the trust and confidence placed in it by the American people. Furthermore, unlawful activities can disqualify him for employment by the Government of the United States. It is, therefore, expected that employees will obey not only the letter of the law but the spirit of the law as well whether they be engaged in transactions of a personal or official nature. With respect to investigative activities, this admonition particularly applies to entrapment or the use of any other improper, illegal, or unethical tactics in the procurement of evidence. In this regard, it should be especially noted that, in securing information concerning mail matter, the Bureau will not tolerate a violation of law (Title 18, USC, §§ 1702, 1703, 1708, and 1709). Furthermore, employees must not tamper with, interfere with, or open mail in violation of law nor aid, abet or condone the opening of mail illegally by any employee of the U. S. Postal Service.

As members of a Federal investigative agency, FBI employees must at all times zealously guard and defend the rights and liberties guaranteed to all individuals by the Constitution. Therefore, FBI employees must not engage in any investigative activity which could abridge in any way the rights guaranteed to a citizen of the United States by the Constitution and under no circumstances shall employees of the FBI engage in any conduct which may result in defaming the character, reputation, integrity, or dignity of any citizen or organization of citizens of the United States.

Employees must not install secret telephone systems or microphones without Bureau authority.

No brutality, physical violence, duress or intimidation of individuals by our employees will be countenanced nor will force be used greater than that necessary to effect arrest or for self-defense.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED mor-10

62-1/6395- | ENULUSUNG

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

LTR LHM Memo Report dated 11/25/75

U'S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

Caption of Document:

Re 11/7/75 Request re Bureau's operation of informants in the internal security field.

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by:

Received by:

Title:

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI



SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff FROM: ATTN: Central Index " FRI SHB.TECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees 1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term. If a document was made available 2. DATE PROVIDED for review but not transmitted, so note.) 11/25/75 DOCUMENT BRIEFING INTERVIEW TESTIMONY OTHER 3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate) ssc 35 4. IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject) Memorandum 5. IN RESPONSE TO (list date and item number if in response to formal request, other-6. CLASSIFICATION OF wise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.) INFORMATION (enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword) SSC letter 11/7/75 H 7. KEY WORDS (enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis) Operating procedures 8. SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this item) Information concerning this Bureau's operation of informants in the Internal Security field. 62-116395 FMK::fmk ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX (4) IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75 TREAT AS YELL

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE!! 90000 BYS

DATE

#### INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY — enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz (1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis) 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

The Attorney General

November 24, 1975

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC) 1 - Mr. T. J. McNiff 1 - Mr. R. D. Hampton

This is in response to SSC letter dated November 19, 1975, requesting certain statistics regarding FBI Security and Extremist Informants for 1971 and 1975.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is the original of a memorandum which is our complete response to this request. A copy of this memorandum is being provided for your records.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

RDH:mjg/m/

Assoc. Dir.

Dep. AD Adm. \_

Dep. AD Inv. \_

Asst. Dir.:

Admin. \_\_\_\_\_

Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_

Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_

Files & Com. \_

Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_
Ident. \_\_\_\_
Inspection \_\_\_\_
Intell. \_\_\_\_

Representation Contained.

#

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GPO: 1975 O - 569-920

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz (1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis) 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

62-116395

Hovember 24, 1975

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar 1 - Mr. T. J. McNiff U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE 1 - Mr. R. D. Hampton TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE2 REQUEST FOR CERTAIN STATISTICS REGARDING FDI SECURITY AND EXTREMIST INFORMANTS FOR 1971 AND 1975

Reference is made to SSC letter dated November 19, 1975, requesting the captioned information. This information is presently available for review by members of the SSC Staff at FBIHO.

1 - The Attorney General

RDH:mjga (8)

NOTE:

Previously, copies of the 1971 Domestic Intelligence Division and the 1975 Intelligence Division reports were made available to the SSC for review. At that time, the total numbers of informants was excised. As a result of agreements between Department of Justice, FBI officials and the SSC, these figures are now being made available to the SSC for their 11/19/75

request. HSC, by letter dated 8/7/75, was granted access to figures representing total number of informants operated by this - Bureau in the Internal Security, Counterintelligence and Criminal Dep. AD Adm. \_ fields as of 6/30/75.

> ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS VNCLASSIFIE

> > TELETYPE UNIT

7 inspection egicals

62-116395-

Inspection \_ Intell. . Laboratory . Plan. & Eval. Spec. Inv. \_

Asst. Dir.:

Admin. \_ Comp. Syst. \_ Ext. Affairs \_\_\_ Files & Com. \_ Gen. Inv. \_ Ident.

Training .

Legal Coun. -Telephone Rm. \_

Director Sec'y \_\_\_ MAIL ROOM \_\_\_\_

NW 55101 DocId:32989554 Page 164

## BREAKDOWN OF INFORMANTS AND SOURCES BY CATEGORY ON OR ABOUT JUNE 30, 1975

Informants

Under Development

Internal Security

1,040

554



NATIONAL SECURITY INTOPMATION Unauthorized Distinuers Subject to Criminal Sanctions

DECLASSIFIED BY DE ATM /UMC
ON 11/14/0000
MDR-16

62-116395-1169

# SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM BASIC REVOLUTIONARY AND NEW LEFT ORGANIZATIONS

At the time of the last inspection in January, 1971, the Internal Security Section handled informants only in the basic revolutionary organizations and related groups. There was no Security Informant Unit as such, informants being handled on subversive organization desks. On June 16, 1971, a Security Informant Unit was formed and this Unit now handles informants in the New Left field as well as in basic revolutionary; organizations and related groups.

At last inspection there were member informants in the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA); at present there are a decrease of at last inspection there were member informants in the Socialist Workers Party (SWP); at present there are an increase of a As of July 31, 1971, date of latest monthly tabulation, the security Informant unit mandled a total of 795 security informants and 671 potential security informants, a total of 1,466. This includes informant cases transferred from the New Left Section to the Security Informant Unit in the Internal Security Section on June 16, 1971.

There has been continuing recognition of the fact there must be no letdown in maintaining adequate informant coverage. However, economy has increasingly become a primary factor. In line with the President's message on August 15, 1971, tightening economic controls and our continuing efforts to hold down expenditures; the field is being instructed by letter to all offices to cut down payments to security and extremist informants and sources by five percent. To assure uniformity and fairness in the application of this cutback throughout the field, each office was instructed to follow this formula: Total expenditures for all such informants and sources for the six month period ending July 31, 1971; reduce this total by five percent; divide the resulting figure by six (months). The resulting figure is to be the guideline for each office.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/19/71
HEM:cb CONFIDENTIAL

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION:

Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Griminal Sanctions

ON 11/14/0000 pmf

94

The prime purpose of development and utilization

Fof extremist informants and sources is to provide intelligence
and evidenciary information concerning black and white

extremist organizations and individuals. These sources are

also called upon to furnish information concerning situations
affecting civil unrest in all parts of the country.

Supervision of extremist informants at the Seat of Government includes review and approval of new informants and confidential sources, review of progress of informants, review of payments being made to informants, analysis of informant coverage in each field office, analysis of nationwide informant coverage of the various extremist organizations, coordination of informant coverage of specific functions such as Black Panther Party (BPP) and other extremist groups: conventions, supervision of operations for the development of top-echelon BPP informants, and other special projects such as development of information concerning black extremist underground escape routes and coordinating utilization of informants abroad with other agencies. All procedures are constantly evaluated in an effort to increase the efficiency of our operation and to provide the field with the necessary supervision with a minimum of paper work.

As of 7/31/71 we are operating a total of 7,477 extremist informants compared with a total of 7,184 at the time of the last Inspection. This is an increase of 293 informants. Concerning the above informants, 583 informants report on black extremist organizations and 353 informants report on white extremist organizations such as the Klan. We are operating sphetto informants who provide general information within the black ghetto areas of our cities as compared to sphetto informants at the time of the last Inspection which represents an increase of sphetto informants.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

DocId: 32989554

3/19/71
JGD:maz

CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

November 19, 1975

Michael E. Shaheen, Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Mike:

In connection with our investigation of the FBI's use of informants in the intelligence area and our public hearings on December 2 on this subject, enclosed is a request for information on the number of such informants.

In view of the short time remaining before our public hearing on December 2, we request that this information be supplied as soon as possible, and no later than November 24, 1975.

Sincerely,

John Elliff Director Domestic Intelligence Task Force

Enclosure

cc: Paul V. Daly

Office of Congressional Affairs Federal Bureau of Investigation

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE II | 14 000 BY 580 mm | 1000 MOR-16

### Request for Information

The following information is requested:

- 1. The number of Internal Security Informants on or about June 30, 1975
- 2. The numbers contained in the following sentence which appears on page 94 of the Report of the inspection of the Domestic Intelligence Division, August 17-September 9, 1971 (these numbers were deleted from the copy of the report produced to the Committee)

"As of July 31, 1971, date of latest monthly tabulation, the Security Informant Unit handled a total of (de-1951 leted) security informants and (deleted) potential security informants, a total of (deleted)."

- 3. The numbers contained in the following sentences which appear on page 152 of the Report of the inspection of the Domestic Intelligence Division, August 17-September 9, 1971 (these numbers were deleted from the copy of the report produced to the Committee)
  - "As of 7/31/71 we are operating a total of (deleted) extremist informants compared with a total of (deleted) at the time of the last inspection...Concerning the above informants, (deleted) informants report on black extremist
    - organizations and (deleted) informants report on white extremist organizations such as the Klan."

In Deadh

12

### 5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: Senate Select Committee				
LTR LHM Memo Report dated 11/24/75				
Caption of Document: REQST FOR CTNMSTATCS RGRNG F SECRTY & EXTRMNST INFRMNTS FOR '71 & '75 Ref is mad to SSC 1et 11/19/75 rqstng cptn	4			
Originating Office: FBI	,			
Delivered by: Richard T. Taylor, Jr Date: 11/28/75				
Received by: Thill Lymn 5/aff)				
Title:				
Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI				

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE!! | 1900 BYSP & Pun | 1900 BYS

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SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

BEFORE COMPLETING.

Intelligence Community Staff TO: FROM: ATTN: Central Index TITE

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)

2. DATE PROVIDED

DOCUMENT

BRIEFING

INTERVIEW

TESTIMONY

OTHER

11/24/75

#### FOR DEVIEW

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)

SSC HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer. interviewee, testifier and subject)

#### Menorandua

5. IN RESPONSE TO (list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)

SSC. letter 11/19/75

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (enter U. C. S. TS or Codeword)

II

7. KEY WORDS (enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)

### Intelligence collection Information handling

8. SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this item)

Available for review by appropriate SSC Staff Monbers at FBIHQ certain statistics regarding FBI Security and Extremist Informats for 1971 and 1975.

62-116395

FMK: fmk

(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSIUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE! WAGOO BY SPARE MOR-16

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

#### INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY — enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

On this Air INFORMATION CONTAINED

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ON OR-16

ON OR-16

6911

62-116375-1169

enclosure

Exercis morked in red. RETAIN

# BREAKDOWN OF INFORMANTS AND SOURCES BY CATEGORY ON OR ABOUT JUNE 30, 1975

Informants	Under Development
1,040	554
466	886
6,983	11,758
deputable combined to the combined of the comb	Olicitus Manage Nationales
8,489	13,198
	1,040 466 6,983



NATIONAL SECURITY INTORMATION Unauthorized Dislicators Subject to Criminal Sanctions

CI 11/14/2000: IMC

BASIC REVOLUTIONARY AND NEW LEFT ORGANIZATIONS

At the time of the last inspection in January, 1971, the Internal Security Section handled informants only in the basic revolutionary organizations and related groups. There was no Security Informant Unit as such, informants being handled on subversive organization desks. On June 16, 1971, a Security Informant Unit was formed and this Unit now handles informants in the New Left field as well as in basic revolutionary organizations and related groups.

At last inspection there were (264) member informants in the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA); at present there are (226) a decrease of (38.) At last inspection there were (31) member informants in the Socialist Workers Party (SWP); at present there are (48) an increase of (17). As of July 31, 1971, date of latest monthly tabulation, the Security Informant unit handled a total of 795 security informants and 671 potential security informants, a total of 1,466. This includes (630) informant cases transferred from the New Left Section to the Security Informant Unit in the Internal Security Section on June 16, 1971.

There has been continuing recognition of the fact there must be no letdown in maintaining adequate informant coverage. However, economy has increasingly become a primary factor. In line with the President's message on August 15, 1971, tightening economic controls and our continuing efforts to hold down expenditures, the field is being instructed by letter to all offices to cut down payments to security and extremist informants and sources by five percent. To assure uniformity and fairness in the application of this cutback throughout the field, each office was instructed to follow this formula: Total expenditures for all such informants and sources for the six month period ending July 31, 1971; reduce this total by five percent; divide the resulting figure by six (months). The resulting figure is to be the guideline for each office. .

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/19/71

HEM:cb

4-H

CONFIDENTIAL

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
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of extremist informants and sources is to provide intelligence and evidenciary information concerning black and white extremist organizations and individuals. These sources are also called upon to furnish information concerning situations affecting civil unrest in all parts of the country.

Supervision of extremist informants at the Seat of Government includes review and approval of new informants and confidential sources, review of progress of informants, review of payments being made to informants, analysis of informant coverage in each field office, analysis of nationwide informant coverage of the various extremist organizations, coordination of informant coverage of specific functions such as Black Panther Party (BPP) and other extremist groups; conventions, supervision of operations for the development of top-echelon BPP informants, and other special projects such as development of information concerning black extremist underground escape routes and coordinating utilization of informants abroad with other agencies. All procedures are constantly evaluated in an effort to increase the efficiency of our operation and to provide the field with the necessary supervision with a minimum of paper work.

As of 7/31/71 we are operating a total of 7,477 extremist informants compared with a total of 7,184 at the time of the last Inspection. This is an increase of 293 informants. Concerning the above informants, 583 informants report on black extremist organizations and 353 informants report on white extremist organizations such as the Klan. We are operating 6,541 ghetto informants who provide general information within the black ghetto areas of our cities as compared to 6,224 ghetto informants at the time of the last Inspection which represents an increase of 317 ghetto informants.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/19/71 JGD:maz CONFIDENTIAL

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

152

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams 2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz (1 - J. B. Hotis)1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall November 24, 1975 1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar 1 - Mr. P. E. Nugent

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letter dated November 7, 1975, containing requests for materials concerning Martin Luther King, Jr., and this Bureau's memorandum in response to same dated November 17, 1975.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is the original of a memorandum which correlates information in referenced FBI memorandum and that furnished to the SSC at its hearing on November 19, 1975. A copy of the memorandum is also enclosed for your records.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr. Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination

PEN:adn adn (10)

NOTE:

S1-110

62-116=75-11

During testimony before the SSC 11/19/75, Deputy Associate Director James B. Adams was asked to furnish information concerning his knowledge of reasons employed by former Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy in denying electronic surveillance coverage of King in July, 1953 and for his subsequent approval of such coverage in October, 1963. Mr. Dedams 1975

Comp. Syst. . Ext. Affairs \_ Files & Com. . Gen. Inv. -Inspection .

ssoc. Dir.

Training. Telephone Rm.

Dep. AD Adm. \_

Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_ sst. Dir.:

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED GPO: 1975 O - 569-920

TELETYPE UNIT

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

#### NOTE CONTINUED:

indicated unfamiliarity with this information and in response to the SSC's request to furnish information in that regard he agreed to do so. Documents and information on this subject matter were previously furnished the SSC by letterhead memorandum dated 11/17/75. Attached letterhead memorandum being directed to the Department and the SSC in order to direct their attention to information previously furnished in this matter.

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams 2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz (1 - J. B. Hotis) 1 - W. R. Wannall 1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar 1 - Mr. P. E. Nugent November 24, 1975

MI

62-116395

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letter dated November 7, 1975, containing requests for materials concerning Martin Luther King, Jr., and this Bureau's memorandum in response to same dated November 17, 1975.

On November 19, 1975, FBI Deputy Associate Director James D. Adams appeared before the SSC. During questioning concerning the FBI's initiation of electronic surveillance of Martin Luther King, Jr., Mr. Adams was asked to furnish information concerning his knowledge of the reasons employed by former Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy in denying electronic surveillance coverage of King in July, 1963, and for his subsequent approval of such coverage in October, 1963.

ca)

To document and expand upon lie. Adams' answer, the SSC's attention is invited to the material which was furnished to the SSC with referenced FBI memorandum.

1 - The Attorney General

PEN: adn all (9)

NW 55101 DocId:32989554 Page 180

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5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535  SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  Caption of Property 1st Request re materials concerning  M.L. King. This memo supplements material previously furnished 11-17.
Delivered by:  Received by:  Title:
Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE!! 9 0000 BYSPARM MOF

ENCLOSURE.

12-116375-1168



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BEFORE COMPLETING. CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE TO: Intelligence Community Staff FROM: ATTN: Central Index FBI SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees 1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term. If a document was made available 2. DATE PROVIDED for review but not transmitted, so note.) 11/24/75 DOCUMENT BRIEFING INTERVIEW TESTIMONY OTHER 3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate) SSC 数か HSC 4. IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer. interviewee, testifier and subject) Memorandun 5. IN RESPONSE TO (list date and item number if in response to formal request, other-6. CLASSIFICATION OF wise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.) INFORMATION (enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword) SSG letter 11/7/75 U

7. KEY WORDS (enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)

# Information handling

8. SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this item)

SSC attention directed to previouse response by FDI regarding

statement made by Deputy Associate Director James B. Adams in his appearance before SSC 11/19/75 relating to FDI's initiation of electronic surveillences of Martin Luther King, Jr. and the reasons employed by former Attorney General Kennedy in denying electronic surveillance coverage of King in 7/63 and for his subsequent approval of such coverage in 10/63.

62-116395

# TREAT AS YELLOW

FMK: fmk

(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

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DATE II 9 2000 LY SPARM und

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### INSTRUCTIONS

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- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
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SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY — enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

2 - Mr. J. A. (1 - J.B)1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall 1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar 1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford 1 - Mr. E. P. Grigalus

The Attorney General

November 21, 1975

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to BSC letters dated November 7. 1975, and November 18, 1975, requesting access to documents regarding informant matters.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum in response to one of the items in referenced request.

Also enclosed for your records is a copy of the memorandum.

Enclosures- 2

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr. Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination

REC 12' 62-1163

RUSICO MIL

GPO 954-546

EPG: dew (10)

SSC requested certain specific information involving Mary Jo Cook, a former Bureau informant, who furnished 121979 information concerning the Vietnam Veterans Against the War/ Winter Soldier Organization (VVAW/WSO) to the Buffaro Office. Dep. AD Adm. - This informant alleged that she was instructed by the FBI to Dep. AD Inv. - obtain plans of Attica Prison prisoners who were involved in the 1971 Attica Prison uprisings in New York State. A New York Comp. Syst. \_ judge, after introviewing Cook's informant files, ruled that Ext. Affairs — the Government was not guilty of misconduct involving defense Gen. Inv. \_\_\_ Strategy. SSC requested certain specific documents from the files of Mary Jo Cook regarding the purpose Cook's informant Inspection — activity was to serve and the position of the VVAW/WSO in loboratory certain specific areas and legal defense information appearing Plan. & Eval. \_ in Cook's informant files. Other matters were requested Spec. Inv. — which are being handled separately including access to material

Assoc. Dir.

Asst. Dir.;

32989554 Page 184

regarding other informants.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz (1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar 1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford

1 - Mr. E. P. Grigalus

November 21, 1975

62-116395

## U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letters dated November 7, 1975, and November 18, 1975, requesting access to documents regarding the handling of former FBI informant Mary Jo Cook.

These documents have been assembled and are available for review by appropriately cleared SSC staff members at FBI Headquarters.

1 - The Attorney General

EPG:dew (9)

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Assoc. Dir. , Dep. AD Adm. \_ Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_

Asst. Dir.: Admin. \_

Comp. Syst. \_\_ Ext. Affairs \_\_\_

Files & Com. \_\_ Gen. Inv.

Inspection \_\_\_

Intell. Laboratory \_

Plan. & Eval. \_\_ Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_

Training \_\_\_ Legal Coun. \_\_ Telephone Rm. \_\_

Director Sec'y MAIL ROOM TELETY
NW 55101 DocId:32989554 Page 185 MAIL ROOM

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nel without the express appreval of the FBI.

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This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized person-

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5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535
Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
LTR X LHM Memo Report dated 11/21/75
Caption of Document: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
11/7/75 request - Mary Jo. Cook
Originating Office: FBI
Delivered by: Right and 1. Laylor Date: 11/26/25
Received by: Lynsey Oster
Title:CEE
Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

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TESTIMONY

OTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

BEFORE COMPLETING.

Intelligence Community Staff TO ATTN: Central Index

FROM:

FBI

OTHER

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term. If a document was made available

2. DATE PROVIDED

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BRIEFING

11/21/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)

INTERVIEW

SSC \*\* HSC

DOCUMENT

4. IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer. interviewee, testifier and subject)

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5. IN RESPONSE TO (list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)

SSC lotter 11/7/75 and 11/18/75

U

7. KEY WORDS (enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)

# Information handling

8. SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this item)

Available for review by appropriate SSC Staff Members at FINING, regarding the hendling of former FDI informent Mary Jo Cook.

62-116395

FMK: fmk

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMITY INDEX (4)

IN CONSECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

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3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

## INSTRUCTIONS

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- Mr. J. A. Mintz (1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis) 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall 1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

1 - Mr. R. L. Moore

The Attorney General

November 21, 1975

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

By letter dated August 22, 1975, the SSC requested all information relating to the disappearance of Associate Professor Thomas Riha, University of Colorado, any and all background material the Bureau may have on his disappearance and any subsequent information the Eureau has developed on his current whereabouts.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee are the original of a memorandum and enclosures which serve as a response to this request.

A copy of the memorandum with enclosures is being furnished for your records.

Among the enclosures is a transmittal form dated March 16, 1970, from the Office of the Vice President of the United States transmitting to the FBI a letter from Stephen Fischer-Galati, Director, Center for East European Affairs, University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado, dated February 18, 1970. We ar deferring to you any action necessary to obtain the appropriate clearance to furnish this transmittal form and its enclosed letter to SSC. 62-116395

Enclosures (138)

Assoc. Dir. .

Inspection Intell. \_

Spec. Inv. \_

Training \_\_ Legal Coun. \_ Telephone Rm. .

Plan. & Eval. \_

Dep. AD Adm. \_ Dep. AD Inv. \_\_

> 1 - The Deputy Attorney General Michael E. Shaheen, Jr. Attention: Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination

> > CLOSURE IN BULKY ROOM"

CONFIDENTIAL MATERIAL ATTACHED

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RLM: emj

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GPO: 1975 O - 569-920

**B** DEC 12 1975 Asst. Dir.: 62-116395 Admin. Comp. Syst. . Ext. Affairs -Files & Com. \_\_ Gen. Inv. -Ident.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz (1 - J. B. Hotis) 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall 1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar 1 - Mr. R. L. Moore

62-116395

November 21, 1975

United States Senate Select committee TO STUDY COVERNHENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INFORMATION RELATING TO THE DISAPPEARANCE OF ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR THOMAS RIMA. UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO

Reference is made to SSC letter dated August 22, 1975, requesting all information relating to the disappearance of Associate Professor Thomas Riba, any and all background material the FBI may have on his disappearance, and any subsequent information the Bureau has developed on his current whereabouts.

Pursuant to your request, there are enclosed copies of 68 FBI communications and newspaper articles. The enclosures are divided into two parts, one pertaining to Thomas Riba and the other to the related case of Galya Tannenbaum. Together with documents previously furnished to the Committee on June 13, 1975, with reference to Professor Riha, the enclosures represent the entire information available at PBI Headquarters (FBIEQ), including the Identification Division, with reference to the disappearance of Professor Riba.

It is noted that the edges of some documents and nerspaper articles did not reproduce well and that the newspaper article furnished by Stephen Fischer-Calati with his letter of February 18, 1970, to the Vice President of the United States is not legible. Every effort was made to furnish the best copies that could be made of the available material.

RLM: emj (9)

Assoc. Dir. \_ Dep. AD Adm. \_

Asst. Dir.:

Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_

Comp. Syst. \_\_\_

Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_

Training ...

Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_ Files & Com. \_\_

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SEE NOTE, PAGE THREE

nation outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may notice disclosed to the content may not the disclosed to the content may not the conte This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi-

your Comnicities and the content may notice, disclosed to undithorized person-MAIL ROOM net without the express approval of the FBI. ENCLOSURE CONFID

Director Sec'y \_\_\_ NW 55101 DocId: 32989554 190 United States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with respect to Intelligence activities (SSC)

RE: INFORMATION RELATING TO THE DISAPPEARANCE OF ASSOCIATE PROPESSOR THOMAS RIMA, UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO

On the S. J. Papich memorandum to D. J.
Brennan, Jr., dated April 16, 1969, captioned "Thomas Riha,
Internal Security - Czechoslovakia," there is a handwritten
notation "Let to SAC, Denver, 4-22-69, GWA: leg." There is
no such communication in file; however, there is an
April 18, 1969, letter from the Director, PBI, to the SAC,
Denver, covering the same subject matter and having the
identical initials of the person dictating the communication
and of the stenographer.

The various communications and newspaper articles have been furnished in chronological order, except where one document is an enclosure to another, and not necessarily as they appear in the file. Some newspaper articles have been reduced from their original size, but otherwise they are as they appeared in the newspaper.

The letter from the Director, FBI, to the SAC, Denver, dated January 19, 1970, captioned "Thomas Riha, Discellaneous Information" makes reference to a number of communications.

memoranda dated April 21, 1959, and June 2, 1959, were previously furnished to the SSC. The Eureau letters to Washington Field Office, Day 12, 1960, and to Boston, May 25, 1960, and the Boston letter to the Director dated June 30, 1960, do not have any information pertaining to the disappearance of Thomas Riha. The Boston report dated August 31, 1960, is one of the enclosures to this memorandum.

According to the records of the Identification Division of the FBI, the Police Department, Denver, Colorado, placed a missing person notice on Thomas Riba with the Identification Division on February 17, 1970, and removed the notice on August 10, 1972.

JFK Act 6 (1) (B

united States Subate Select Collitate to Stady Governmental Operations vite respect to Intelligence activities (SSC)

RE: INFORMATION BELATING TO THE DISAPPEARANCE OF ASSOCIATE FEDVISOR TEXTAS BUMA, UNIVERSITY OF COLUMNO

The SAC, Denver, airtel to Director. I'll, dated Jonuary 23, 1979, coptioned "Calya Tannenbum, aka, IIIP," could not be located in the FRIED file and a copy was obtained from the Ronver Office.

Inclosures (68)

1 - The Attorney General

#### NOTE:

On 10/14/75, Mr. Walt Elder, CIA, advised Supervisor John P. Thomas that CIA had no objection to the FBI furnishing the SSC with the information contained in S. J. Papich memoranda to D. J. Brennan dated 4/16/69 and 1/13/70 and Bureau letter to SAC, Denver, dated 4/18/69, all captioned "Thomas Riha, IS - Czechoslovakia." Mr. Elder requested that in W. O. Cregar memorandum to W. R. Wannall 2/26/74, same caption, the identity of CIA's source be concealed before furnishing the memorandum to SSC.

On 10/20/75, W. C. Jones, III, Office of Intelligence Liaison, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, U. S. Department of State, advised Liaison Supervisor R. L. Moore that the Department of State had no objection to the FBI furnishing to SSC the information appearing on page 2 of Chicago airtel to the Bureau 9/15/69 captioned "Thomas Riha, IS - CZ."

note continued, page four.

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INFORMATION RELATING TO THE DISAPPEARANCE OF ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR THOMAS RIHA, UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO

## NOTE CONTINUED:

On 10/8/75, Nathan D. Dick, Director, Office of Investigations and Security, Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW), advised Liaison Supervisor R. L. Moore that there was no objection to furnishing to SSC the information attributed to Fred Schmidt, Director of Security, HEW, on 3/30/70 appearing as a handwritten notation on Bureau letter to Dr. Stephen Fischer-Galati dated 3/31/70.

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5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535	
Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE	
LTR LHM Memo Report dated 11/21/75	
U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE. Caption of Document:	
8/22/75 request - RIHA	Ħ
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Originating Office: FBI	
Delivered by Richard 1- 1 astor 1/2. Date: 11/25/15	
Received by: Alkhij Towall	
Title: HOMO	
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8. SUMMARY (see reverse side before	completing this it	em)		
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NW 55101 DocId:32989554 Page 195

#### INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY — enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.